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Abstract
Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge
and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the
notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional
belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic
of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility
models may contain too much information. A proper notion of bisimulation is required
that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required
characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models (with respect to
the plausibility relation), two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of
the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of
such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of
degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does
not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of
belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable,
while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In
view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result.
We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology
and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling.
1 Introduction
A typical approach in belief revision involves preferential orders to express degrees of belief and
knowledge [20, 27]. This goes back to the ‘systems of spheres’ in [25, 16]. Dynamic doxastic
logic was proposed and investigated in [28] in order to provide a link between the (non-modal
logical) belief revision and modal logics with explicit knowledge and belief operators. A
similar approach was pursued in belief revision in dynamic epistemic logic [5, 36, 32, 8, 39],
that continues to develop strongly [12, 33]. We focus on the proper notion of structural
equivalence on models encoding knowledge and belief simultaneously. A prior investigation
into that is [13], which we relate our results to at the end of the paper. Our motivation is
to find suitable structural notions to reduce the complexity of solving planning problems.
Solutions to planning problems are sequences of actions, such as iterated belief revision. It is
the dynamics of knowledge and belief that, after all, motivates our research.
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Figure 1: An arrow x→ y labelled by a means x ≥a y; agent a considers y at least as plausible
as x. We use x >a y to mean x ≥a y and y 6≥a x. Here w2 >a w1, so w1 is strictly more
plausible than w2. Reflexive edges are omitted. Unlisted propositions are false.
The semantics of belief depends on the structural properties of models. To relate the
structural properties of models to a logical language we need a notion of structural similarity,
known as bisimulation. A bisimulation relation relates a modal operator to an accessibility
relation. Plausibility models do not have an accessibility relation as such but a plausibility
relation. This induces a set of accessibility relations: the most plausible worlds are the
accessible worlds for the modal belief operator; and the plausible worlds are the accessible
worlds for the modal knowledge operator. But it contains much more information: to each
modal operator of conditional belief (or of degree of belief) one can associate a possibly distinct
accessibility relation.This raises the question of how to represent the bisimulation conditions
succinctly. Can this be done by reference to the plausibility relation directly, instead of by
reference to these, possibly many, induced accessibility relations? It is now rather interesting
to observe that relative to the modalities of knowledge and belief, the plausibility relation is
already in some way too rich.
The plausibility model ML on the left in Figure 1 consists of five worlds. The proposition
p is true in the top ones and false in the bottom ones. The reverse holds for q: true at the
bottom and false at the top. The a relations in the model correspond to the plausibility order
w3 >a w2 >a w1, interpreted such that the smaller of two elements in the order is the most
plausible of the two. Further, everything that is comparable with the plausibility order is
considered epistemically possible. Hence, the epistemic equivalence classes for agent a in ML
are {w1, w2, w3}, {w4} and {w5}. We can then view the model as a standard multi-agent S5
model plus an ordering on the epistemic possibilities. As w1 is the most plausible world for
a in the equivalence class {w1, w2, w3}, she will in w3 believe p and that b believes ¬p ∧ q.
This works differently from the usual doxastic modal logic, where belief corresponds to the
accessibility relation. In the logics of belief that we study, belief is what holds in the most
plausible world(s) in an epistemic equivalence class. For a, the most plausible world in her
equivalence class {w1, w2, w3} is w1, so a believes the same formulas in all of them.
In w2 agent b knows p. If a is given the information that b does not consider q possible
(that is, the information that neither w1 nor w3 is the actual world), then a believes that b
knows p – or conditional on Kb¬q, a believes Kbp. Such a statement is an example of the logic
of conditional belief LC defined in Section 3. In LC we write this statement as BKb¬qa Kbp.
Now examine w3. We will show that w1 and w3 are modally equivalent for L
C : they
agree on all formulas of that language—no information expressible in LC distinguishes the
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two worlds. This leads to the observation that no matter where we move w3 in the plausibility
ordering for a, modal equivalence is preserved. Similarly, we can move w2 anywhere we like
except making it more plausible than w1. If we did, then a would believe Kbp unconditionally,
and the formulas true in the model would have been changed.
It turns out that moving worlds about in the plausibility order can be done for all models,
as long as we obey one (conceptually) simple rule: Grouping worlds into “modal equivalence
classes” of worlds modally equivalent to each other, we are only required to preserve the
ordering between the most plausible worlds in each modal equivalence class. Only the most
plausible world in each class matters.
Another crucial observation is that standard bisimulation in terms of ≥a does not give
correspondence between bisimulation and modal equivalence. For instance, while w1 and w3
are modally equivalent, they are not “standardly” bisimilar with respect to ≥a: w3 has a
≥a-edge to a Kbp world (w2), whereas w1 does not. Thus, the straightforward, standard
definition of bisimulation does not work, because no modality in the language corresponds
to the plausibility relation. Instead we have an infinite set of modalities corresponding to
relations derived from the plausibility relation. One of the major contributions of this paper
is a solution to exactly this problem.
Making w3 as plausible as w1 and appropriately renaming worlds gets us MR of Figure
1. Here the modally equivalent worlds u1 and u3 are equally plausible, modally equivalent
and standardly bisimilar. This third observation gives a sense of how we solve the problem
generally. Rather than using ≥a directly, our definition of bisimulation checks accessibility
with respect to a relation ≥Ra derived from ≥a and the bisimulation relation R itself. Post-
poning details for later we just note that in the present example the derived relation forML is
exactly the plausibility relation forMR. This indicates what we later prove: This new derived
relation reestablishes the correspondence between bisimilarity and modal equivalence.
The modelMC of Figure 1 is the bisimulation contraction of the right model using standard
bisimilarity. It is the bisimulation contraction of both models with the bisimulation notion
informally defined in the previous paragraph. In previous work on planning with single-agent
plausibility models [2], finding contractions of plausibility models is needed for decidability
and complexity results. In this paper we do this for the first time for multi-agent plausibility
models, opening new vistas in applications of modal logic to automated planning.
Overview of content In Section 2 we introduce plausibility models and the proper and
novel notion of bisimulation on these models, and prove various properties of bisimulation. In
Section 3 we define the three logics of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief, and
provide some further historical background on these logics. In Section 4 we demonstrate that
bisimilarity corresponds to logical equivalence (on image-finite and preimage-finite models) for
all three core logics, so that, somewhat remarkably, one could say that the content of a given
model can equally well be described in any of these logics. Then, in Section 5 we determine
the relative expressivity of the three logics, including more expressive combinations of their
primitive modalities. The main result here is that the logics of conditional and degrees of belief
are incomparable, and that the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, but
that the logic of safe belief is (strictly) more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In
Section 6, we put our result in the perspective of other recent investigations, mainly the study
by Lorenz Demey [13], and in the perspective of possible applications: decidable planning.
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2 Plausibility models and bisimulation
A well-preorder on a set X is a reflexive and transitive binary relation D on X such that
every non-empty subset has D-minimal elements. The set of minimal elements (for D) of
some Y ⊆ X is the set MinD Y defined as {y ∈ Y | y
′ D y for all y′ ∈ Y }.1 As any two-
element subset Y = {x, y} of X also has minimal elements, we have that x D y or y D x.
Thus all elements in X are D-comparable.
Given any binary relation R on X, we use R= to denote the reflexive, symmetric, and
transitive closure of R (the equivalence closure of R). For any equivalence relation R on X,
we write [x]R for {x
′ ∈ X | (x, x′) ∈ R}. A binary relation R on X is image-finite if and only
if for every x ∈ X, {x′ ∈ X | (x, x′) ∈ R} is finite. A relation is preimage-finite if and only if
for every x ∈ X, {x′ ∈ X | (x′, x) ∈ R} is finite. We say R is (pre)image-finite if it is both
image-finite and preimage-finite. We often write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R. Given subsets
Y,Z ⊆ X, we define Y RZ if and only if yRz for all y ∈ Y and all z ∈ Z.
Definition 1 (Plausibility model). A plausibility model for a countably infinite set of propo-
sitional symbols P and a finite set of agents A is a tuple M = (W,≥, V ), where
• W is a set of worlds called the domain, denoted D(M);
• ≥: A→ P(W ×W ) is a function mapping each a ∈ A into a plausibility relation ≥(a),
usually abbreviated ≥a. For each a ∈ A and w ∈ W , ≥a is a well-preorder on the set
{w′ ∈W | w ≥a w
′ or w′ ≥a w}. Each ≥a is required to be (pre)image-finite;
• V :W → 2P is a valuation.
For w ∈W , (M,w) is a pointed plausibility model.
If w ≥a v then v is at least as plausible as w (for agent a), and the ≥a-minimal elements are
the most plausible worlds. For the symmetric closure of ≥a we write ∼a: this is an equivalence
relation on W called the epistemic relation (for agent a). If w ≥a v but v 6≥a w we write
w >a v (v is more plausible than w), and for w ≥a v and v ≥a w we write w ≃a v (w and v
are equiplausible). Instead of w ≥a v (w >a v) we may write v ≤a w (v <a w).
Note that we have required each relation ≥a to be (pre)image-finite. This amounts to
requiring that all equivalence classes of ∼a are finite, while still allowing infinite domains.
This requirement is not part of the definition of plausibility models provided in [8]. We
require it here, since it leads to simplifications without any significant reduction in generality:
1. We will show full correspondence between bisimilarity and modal equivalence for three
different logics over plausibility models. As is the case in standard modal logic, this
correspondence can only be achieved for (pre)image-finite models (the direction from
modal equivalence to bisimilarity only hold for such models, see e.g. [9]). Simply as-
suming (pre)image-finiteness from the outset simplifies the presentation, as we do not
have to repeat this restriction in a large number of places.
2. Some of our later results are going to rely on the existence of a largest autobisimulation
(see below). Usually it is quite trivial to show the existence of a largest bisimulation,
1This notion of minimality is non-standard and taken from [8]. Usually a minimal element of a set is an
element that is not greater than any other element.
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since the union of any set of bisimulations is a bisimulation. However, we need a non-
standard notion of bisimulation for our purposes, and for such bisimulations closure
under union is far from a trivial result.2 Given our first correspondence result between
bisimilarity and modal equivalence, we are however going to get this result for free (see
Section 4.1).
We now proceed to define a notion of autobisimulation on a plausibility model. This notion
is non-standard, because there is no one-to-one relation between the plausibility relation for
an agent and a modality for that agent in the logics defined later. In the definition below (and
from now on), we allow ourselves some further notational abbreviations. Let M = (W,≥, V )
denote a plausibility model. Let a ∈ A and w ∈W , then we write [w]a instead of [w]∼a . Now
let Z ⊆ [w]a, then we write MinaZ instead of Min≥a Z. For any binary relation R on W , we
write w ≥Ra v for Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a). When w ≥
R
a v and v ≥
R
a w, we
write w ≃Ra v.
Definition 2 (Autobisimulation). LetM = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model. An autobisim-
ulation on M is a non-empty relation R ⊆ W ×W such that for all (w,w′) ∈ R and for all
a ∈ A:
[atoms] V (w) = V (w′);
[forth≥] If v ∈W and w ≥
R
a v, there is a v
′ ∈W such that w′ ≥Ra v
′ and (v, v′) ∈ R;
[back≥] If v
′ ∈W and w′ ≥Ra v
′, there is a v ∈W such that w ≥Ra v and (v, v
′) ∈ R;
[forth≤] If v ∈W and w ≤
R
a v, there is a v
′ ∈W such that w′ ≤Ra v
′ and (v, v′) ∈ R;
[back≤] If v
′ ∈W and w′ ≤Ra v
′, there is a v ∈W such that w ≤Ra v and (v, v
′) ∈ R.
A total autobisimulation on M is an autobisimulation withW as both domain and codomain.
Our bisimulation relation is non-standard in the [back] and [forth] clauses. A standard
[forth] condition based on an accessibility relation ≥a would be
If v ∈W and w ≥a v, there is a v
′ ∈W ′ such that w′ ≥a v
′ and (v, v′) ∈ R.
Here, R only appears in the part ‘(v, v′) ∈ R’. But in the definition of autobisimulation
for plausibility models, in [forth≥], the relation R also features in the condition for applying
[forth≥] and in its consequent, namely as the upper index in w ≥
R
a v and w
′ ≥Ra v
′. This
means that R also determines which v are accessible from w, and which v′ are accessible from
w′. This explains why we define an autobisimulation on a single model before a bisimulation
between distinct models: We need the bisimulation relation R to determine the plausibility
relation ≥Ra from the plausibility relation ≥a on any given model first, before structurally
comparing distinct models.
Example 1. The models ML and MR of Figure 1 are reproduced in Figure 2. Consider the
relation R = Rid ∪ {(w1, w3), (w3, w1), (w4, w5), (w5, w4)}, where Rid is the identity relation
2Without the restriction to (pre)image-finite models, we were unable to prove the existence of a largest
bisimulation. We leave this challenge open to future research(ers).
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Figure 2: The left and right models of Figure 1, with the dotted lines showing the largest
autobisimulations (modulo reflexivity).
on W . With this R, we get that w1 and w3 are equiplausible for ≥
R
a :
w1 ≃
R
a w3 iff
Mina([w1]R= ∩ [w1]a) ≃a Mina([w3]R= ∩ [w3]a) iff
Mina{w1, w3} ≃a Mina{w1, w3} iff
w1 ≃a w1
We also get that w2 ≥
R
a w3:
w2 ≥
R
a w3 iff
Mina([w2]R= ∩ [w2]a) ≥a Mina([w3]R= ∩ [w3]a) iff
Mina{w2} ≥a Mina{w1, w3} iff
w2 ≥a w1
This gives ≥Ra = {(w1, w3), (w3, w1), (w2, w3), (w2, w1)} ∪ Rid. For b, we get ≥
R
b = ≥b. The
autobisimulation R on ML is shown in Figure 2. It should be easy to check that R is indeed
an autobisimulation. To help, we will justify why (w4, w5) is in R: For ≥
R
b , we have that, as
(w1, w3) ∈ R and w1 ≥
R
b w4, there must be a world v such that w3 ≥
R
b v and (w4, v) ∈ R.
This v is w5.
Note that R is the largest autobisimulation. Based on [atoms] there are only two possible
candidate pairs that could potentially be added to R (modulo symmetry), namely (w1, w2)
and (w2, w3). But w2 does not have a b-edge to a q world, whereas both w1 and w3 do. There
is therefore nothing more to add.
The largest autobisimulation for MR is completely analogous, as shown in Figure 2.
Lemma 1. Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model and R a binary relation on W . If
(w,w′) ∈ R= and w ∼a w
′ then w ≃Ra w
′.
Proof. From (w,w′) ∈ R= and w ∼a w
′ we get [w]R= = [w
′]R= and [w]a = [w
′]a and hence
[w]R=∩[w]a = [w
′]R=∩[w
′]a. Thus alsoMina([w]R=∩[w]a) = Mina([w
′]R=∩[w
′]a), immediately
implying w ≃Ra w
′.
Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model. By definition, for each agent a, ≥a is a
well-preorder on each ∼a-equivalence class. The following result shows that the same holds
for ≥Ra where R is any binary relation.
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Lemma 2. Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model and R a binary relation on M . Then
≥Ra is a well-preorder on each ∼a-equivalence class.
Proof. The relation ≥a partitions W into a well-preorder on each ∼a-equivalence class, by
definition. We need to show that ≥Ra does the same. Hence we need to prove: 1) ≥
R
a is
reflexive; 2) ≥Ra is transitive; 3) any ∼a-equivalence class has ≥
R
a -minimal elements; 4) if two
worlds are related by ≥Ra they are also related by ∼a.
Reflexivity of ≥Ra is trivial. Transitivity : Let (w, v), (v, u) ∈ ≥
R
a . Then Mina([w]R= ∩
[w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a), and Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a) ≥a Mina([u]R= ∩ [u]a). Using that for any
sets X,Y,Z, if X ≥a Y and Y ≥a Z then X ≥a Z (transitivity of ≥a for sets is easy to check),
we obtain that Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([u]R= ∩ [u]a) and therefore (w, u) ∈ ≥
R
a . Minimal
elements: Consider a ∼a-equivalence classW
′′ ⊆W , and letW ′ ⊆W ′′ be a non-empty subset.
Suppose W ′ does not have ≥Ra minimal elements. Then for all w
′ ∈ W ′ there is a w′′ ∈ W ′
such that w′′ <Ra w
′, i.e. Mina([w
′′]R=∩[w
′′]a) <a Mina([w
′]R=∩[w
′]a). As w
′ ∈ [w′]R=∩[w
′]a,
we get {w′} ≥a Mina([w
′]R= ∩ [w
′]a) and then Mina([w
′′]R= ∩ [w
′′]a) <a {w
′}. In other words,
for all w′ ∈ W ′ there is a u ∈ W , namely any u ∈ Mina([w
′′]R= ∩ [w
′′]a), such that u <a w
′.
This contradicts ≥a being a well-preorder on W
′′. We have now shown 1), 2) and 3). Finally
we show 4): Assume w ≥Ra v, that is, Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a). This implies
the existence of an x ∈ Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) and a y ∈ Mina([w]R= ∩ [v]a) with x ≥a y. By
choice of x and y we have x ∼a w and y ∼a v. From x ≥a y we get x ∼a y. Hence we have
w ∼a x ∼a y ∼a v, as required.
Proposition 1. On any plausibility model there exists a largest autobisimulation. Further-
more, the largest autobisimulation is an equivalence relation.
We postpone the proof of this result to Section 4.1, since it is going to follow from the
correspondence between bisimilarity and modal equivalence for our language of conditional
belief (Theorem 1). Let us already now reassure the reader that we are not risking any circular
reasoning here: None of the results that lead to Theorem 1 and hence to Proposition 1 rely
on largest autobisimulations.
Definition 3 (Bisimulation). Let M = (W,≥, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′) be plausibility
models and let M ′′ = M ⊔M ′ be the disjoint union of the two. Given an autobisimulation
R on M ′′, if R′ = R ∩ (W ×W ′) is non-empty, then R′ is called a bisimulation between M
and M ′. A bisimulation between (M,w) and (M ′, w′) is a bisimulation between M and M ′
containing (w,w′).
Example 2. Take another look at MC and MR of Figure 1. Let M
′ = MC ⊔ MR and
consider possible autobisimulations here. From Figure 2 we have the existence of a largest
autobisimulation on MR. For MC , the largest autobisimulation is just the identity. Naming
them RR and RC respectively, we (trivially) have that RR∪RC is an autobisimulation onM
′.
The question is whether we can extend RR ∪ RC to an autobisimulation on M ′ connecting
the submodels MR to MC . We can. This new autobisimulation is R = R
′ ∪RR ∪RC , where
R′(u1) = R
′(u3) = {v1}, R
′(u2) = {v2} and R
′(u4) = R
′(u5) = {v3}. Now we easily get
a bisimulation between MR and MC as R ∩ (D(MR) × D(MC)) = R
′. Figure 3 shows the
bisimulation R′.
Definition 4 (Bisimulation contraction). Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model and let
R be the largest autobisimulation on M . The bisimulation contraction of M is the model
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Figure 3: See Figure 1. The dotted edges show the largest bisimulation between MC and
MR. Model MC is isomorphic to the bisimulation contraction of MR (on the left) and to the
bisimulation contraction of ML (not depicted).
M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′) such that W ′ = {[w]R | w ∈ W}, V
′([w]R) = V (w), and for all agents a
and worlds w, v ∈W :
[w]R ≥
′
a [v]R iff for some w
′ ∈ [w]R and v
′ ∈ [v]R: w
′ ≥Ra v
′.
Example 3. We compute the simulation contraction M ′R = (W
′,≥′, V ′) of MR = (W,≥, V ).
For ≥′a and ≥
′
b take the reflexive closures.
W ′ = {{u1, u3}, {u2}, {u4, u5}}
≥′a = {({u2}, {u1, u3})}
≥′b = {{u1, u3}, {u4, u5})}
V ′({u1, u3}) = {p}
V ′({u2}) = {p}
V ′({u4, u5}) = {q}
Model MC is isomorphic to both the bisimulation contraction of ML and the bisimulation
contraction of MR.
Proposition 2. The bisimulation contraction of a plausibility model is a plausibility model
and is bisimilar to that model.
This proposition is not hard to prove, so we do not provide a full proof, but only sketch
the overall idea. First, to prove that the bisimulation contraction (W ′,≥′, V ′) of a plausibility
model (W,≥, V ) is a plausibility model, we simply have to prove that the relations ≥′a are
well-preorders on each ∼′a equivalence class. That is shown by first proving reflexivity of
≥′a, then transitivity of ≥
′
a, and finally by proving that any non-empty subset has minimal
elements with respect to ≥′a. To show that (W,≥, V ) is bisimilar to (W
′,≥′, V ′), we define
the (functional) relation S : W → W ′ as S = {(w, [w]R) | w ∈ W} and show that this is a
bisimulation relation (that it satisfied [atoms] and the [back] and [forth] conditions).
Definition 5 (Normal plausibility relation, normal model). Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausi-
bility model and let R be the largest autobisimulation on M . For all agents a, the relation
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≥Ra is the normal plausibility relation for agent a in M , for which we may also write a. The
model is normal if for all a, ≥a = ≥
R
a . Any model M can be normalised by replacing all ≥a
by ≥Ra .
Example 4. Consider again the models ML and MR of Figure 2. From the largest bisimu-
lation on ML (shown by dotted edges), we can conclude that MR is the normalisation of ML
(modulo a renaming of the worlds wi to ui, for i = 1, . . . , 5).
Proposition 3. The bisimulation contraction of a plausibility model is normal.
Proof. Let M be a plausibility model, and let M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′) be the bisimulation contrac-
tion of M . The largest autobisimulation on M ′ is the identity relation Rid. For each agent a,
we now have that ≥′Rida = ≥
′
a. Therefore, M
′ is normal.
3 Logical language and semantics
In this section we define the language and the semantics of our logics.
Definition 6 (Logical language). For any countably infinite set of propositional symbols P
and finite set of agents A we define language LCDSPA by:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | B
ϕ
aϕ | B
n
aϕ | aϕ
where p ∈ P , a ∈ A, and n ∈ N.
The formula Kaϕ stands for ‘agent a knows (formula) ϕ’, B
ψ
a ϕ stands for ‘agent a believes
ϕ on condition ψ’, Bnaϕ stands for ‘agent a believes ϕ to degree n’, and aϕ stands for ‘agent
a safely believes ϕ’. (The semantics of these constructs is defined below.) The duals of Ka,
B
ϕ
a and a are denoted K̂a, B̂
ϕ
a and ♦a. We use the usual abbreviations for the boolean
connectives as well as for ⊤ and ⊥, and the abbreviation Ba for B
⊤
a . In order to refer to
the type of modalities in the text, we call Ka a knowledge modality, B
ψ
a a conditional belief
modality, Bna a degree of belief modality, and a a safe belief modality.
In LCDSPA , if A is clear from the context, we may omit that and write L
CDS
P , and if P is
clear from the context, we may omit that as well, so that we get LCDS. The letter C stands
for ‘conditional’, D for ‘degree’, and S for ‘safe’. Let X be any subsequence of CDS, then LX
is the language with, in the inductive definition, only the modalities X (and with knowledge
Ka) for all agents. In our work we focus on the logic of conditional belief with language L
C ,
the logic of degrees of belief with language LD, and the logic of safe belief with language LS.
Definition 7 (Satisfaction Relation). Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model for P and
A, let  be the normal plausibility relation for M , and let w ∈ W , p ∈ P , a ∈ A, and
ϕ,ψ ∈ LCDS . Then:
M,w |= p iff p ∈ V (w)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Kaϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ [w]a
M,w |= Bψa ϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a)
M,w |= Bnaϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Min
n
a [w]a
M,w |= aϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v with w a v
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Figure 4: A plausibility model P and its bisimulation contraction P ′.
where
Min0a[w]a = Mina[w]a
Minn+1a [w]a =
{
[w]a if Min
n
a [w]a = [w]a
Minna [w]a ∪Mina([w]a \Min
n
a [w]a) otherwise
and where JϕKM = {w ∈W |M,w |= ϕ}.
We write M |= ϕ (ϕ is valid on M) to mean that M,w |= ϕ for all w ∈W .
Definition 8 (Modal equivalence). Consider the language LXP , for X a subsequence of CDS.
Given are models M = (W,≥, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′), and w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′. We say
that (M,w) and (M ′, w′) are modally equivalent in LXP , notation (M,w) ≡
X
P (M
′, w′), if and
only if for all ϕ ∈ LXP , M,w |= ϕ if and only if M
′, w′ |= ϕ. If P is obvious from the context
we may write (M,w) ≡X (M ′, w′).
The logic of conditional belief
The logic LC of conditional belief appears in [30, 6, 32, 8], where particularly the latter two
are foundational for dynamic belief revision (older roots are Lewis’ counterfactual conditionals
[25]). An axiomatisation is found in [30]. In this logic, defeasible belief Baϕ is definable as
B⊤a ϕ, while Kaϕ is definable as B
¬ϕ
a ⊥.
Example 5. Consider Figure 1. In the plausibility model MC we have, for instance: MC |=
Kap → (BaBbq ∧ ¬KaBbq): If a knows p (true in v1 and v2), a believes, but does not know,
that b believes q. Another example is MC |= B
¬Bbq
a Kb¬q: Conditional on b not believing q,
a believes that b knows ¬q. Only in v2 does ¬Bbq hold; there Kb¬q holds. A final example
is MC |= Kap → B
K̂bq
a Bbq: From v1 and v2 (where Kap holds), formula K̂bq only holds in
v1, and conditional to that, the one and only most plausible world v1 satisfies Bbq. We can
repeat this exercise in ML and MR, as all three models are bisimilar and therefore, as will be
proved in the next section, logically equivalent.
The logic of degrees of belief
The logic LD of degrees of belief, also known as the logic of graded belief, goes back to
Grove [16] and Spohn [29], although these could more properly be said to be semantic frame-
works to model degrees of belief (there is no relation between the logic of degrees of belief and
Fine’s logic of graded belief [14] and subsequent works, wherein we count the number of pairs
(v,w) ∈ R between two worlds v and w, or, alternatively, label the accessibility relation with
that number). Logics of degrees of belief have seen some popularity in artificial intelligence
and AGM style belief revision, see e.g. [34, 35, 22]. Belief revision based on degrees of belief
have been proposed by [5, 36]. The typical distinction between conviction (arbitrarily strong
10
belief) and knowledge, as in [23, 24], is absent in our logic LD, wherein the strongest form of
belief defines knowledge. Reasoning with degrees of belief is often called quantitative, where
conditional belief can then be called qualitative. In other communities both are called qual-
itative, and quantitive epistemic reasoning approaches are in that case those that combine
knowledge and probabilities [17]. The zeroth degree of belief B0aϕ defines defeasible belief
Baϕ. How Spohn’s work relates to dynamic belief revision as in [6] is discussed in detail in
[37]. There have also been various proposals combining knowledge and belief (B⊤a ϕ or B
0
aϕ)
in a single framework, without considering either conditional or degrees of belief, where the
dynamics are temporal modalities, see [20, 19, 15]. For purposes of further discussions and
the proofs in Section 4.2 we define belief layers as follows:
Definition 9 (Belief Layers). Let M = (W,≥, V ). For w ∈ W , a ∈ A and n ∈ N, the nth
(belief) layer of w for a is defined as Ena [w]a = Mina([w]a \Min
n−1
a [w]a), where we use the
special case Min−1a [w]a = ∅.
This immediately gives the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For M = (W,≥, V ), w ∈ W , a ∈ A and n ∈ N, we have Minna [w]a = E
n
a [w]a ∪
Minn−1a [w]a. For n such that Min
n
a [w]a = [w]a we have E
n+1
a [w]a = ∅. We name the smallest
such n the maximum degree (for a at w). If n is the maximum degree for a at w, we have
M,w |= Kaϕ↔ B
n
aϕ.
In [5, 36, 22] different layers can contain bisimilar worlds. In our approach they cannot,
because we define belief layers on the normal plausibility relation. Unlike [29] our semantics
does not allow empty layers in between non-empty layers. If Ena [w]a 6= ∅ and E
n+2
a [w]a 6= ∅,
then En+1a [w]a 6= ∅. Layers above the maximum degree will be empty, i.e. if there is a
maximum degree n for a at w, as there will always be in our (pre)image-finite models, then
for all k > n, we have Eka [w]a = ∅.
Example 6. In Figure 1, we have that MC |= B
0
aB
0
b q but not MC |= B
1
aB
0
b q. The maximum
degree of belief for a in MC is at either v1 and v2, where it is 1, so MC |= Kaϕ↔ B
1
aϕ. This
is also true in the other two models. Consider now the models P and P ′ in Figure 4 and an
alternative definition of Bna not using a but ≥a (as in [5, 36, 22, 8]). In the ≥a-semantics we
have P |= B2a¬q, as q is false in {y, z, w}. Only when we reach the third degree of belief does
q become uncertain: P 6|= B3a¬q. With a-semantics, 2 is the maximum degree so P 6|= B
2
a¬q.
This can be seen in the bisimilar model P ′, where P ′ 6|= B2a¬q.
The logic of safe belief
The logic LS of safe belief goes back to Stalnaker [30] and has been progressed by Baltag
and Smets (for example, how it relates to conditional belief and knowledge) in [8], which also
gives a detailed literature review involving the roots of conditional belief, degrees of belief,
and safe belief. An agent has safe belief in a formula ϕ iff the agent will continue to believe
ϕ no matter what true information conditions its belief, i.e. M,w |= aϕ iff M,w |= B
ψ
a ϕ for
all -free ψ s.t. M,w |= ψ. In [8] safe belief is defined as M,w |= aϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v
s.t. w ≥a v. For both [30] and [8] true information are subsets of the domain containing the
actual world. When this is what true information is, there is a correspondence between the
two definitions, as indeed noted by Baltag and Smets. The complications of this choice are
addressed in detail in [13]. For us, there is not a correspondence between the two definitions,
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because we can only condition on modally definable subsets. When we, as we do, define safe
belief using a, this correspondence is reestablished.
Example 7. Consider for a final time the models of Figure 1. We have MC , v1 |= aK̂bq,
whereas MC , v2 6|= aK̂bq. Now consider ML and the ≥a-version of safe belief for which we
have ML, w3 6|= aK̂bq. For [30, 8] this is as it should be: For the subset {w2, w3} (which
includes the actual world w3 as required) we have Mina({w2, w3} ∩ [w3]a) = {w2} where
ML, w2 6|= K̂bq. Using the a-version of safe belief, we have ML, w3 |= aK̂bq. For us, this is
as it should be: As our conditional belief picks using JψK ∩ [w]a, any set containing w3 must
include the modally equivalent world w1. This corresponds to first normalising ML to get
MR. In that model, u2 is strictly less plausible than u3.
The semantics we propose for degrees of belief and safe belief are non-standard. Still,
as we show in the following, these non-standard semantics and the standard semantics for
conditional belief are all bisimulation invariant. This makes the results in Section 5 showing
a non-trivial expressivity hierarchy between these logics even more remarkable.
4 Bisimulation characterisation for LC, LD and LS
4.1 Bisimulation correspondence for conditional belief
In the following we prove that for the language LC bisimilarity implies modal equivalence and
vice versa. This shows that our notion of bisimulation is proper for the language and models at
hand. The proof of Proposition 4 below is essentially a standard proof of bisimilarity implying
modal equivalence: modal equivalence is proved by induction on the structure of the formula,
where in the induction step the back and forth conditions of bisimilarity are applied to the
induction hypothesis. However, the induction case of conditional belief formulas Bγaψ is a
bit more involved than for standard modalities. Additional work is needed to ensure that
when applying the back and forth conditions we produce a world which is among the minimal
γ-worlds.
Proposition 4. Bisimilarity implies modal equivalence for LC .
Proof. Assume (M1, w1)↔(M2, w2). Then, by definition, there exists an autobisimulation
R on the disjoint union of M1 and M2 with (w1, w2) ∈ R. Let M = (W,≥, V ) denote the
disjoint union of M1 and M2. We then need to prove that (M,w1) and (M,w2) are modally
equivalent in LC . We will show that for all ϕ in LC , for all (w,w
′) ∈ R, if M,w |= ϕ then
M,w′ |= ϕ. This implies the required (the other direction being symmetric). The proof is
by induction on the syntactic complexity of ϕ. The propositional cases are easy, so we only
consider the cases ϕ = Kaψ and ϕ = B
γ
aψ. Consider first ϕ = Kaψ. In this case we assume
M,w |= Kaψ, that is, M,v |= ψ for all v with w ∼a v. Let v
′ be chosen arbitrarily with
w′ ∼a v
′. We need to prove M,v′ |= ψ. From Lemma 2 we have that ≥Ra is a well-preorder on
each ∼a-equivalence class. Since w
′ ∼a v
′ we hence get that either w′ ≥Ra v
′ or v′ ≥Ra w
′. We
can assume w′ ≥Ra v
′, the other case being symmetric. Then since (w,w′) ∈ R and w′ ≥Ra v
′,
[back≥] gives us a v s.t. (v, v
′) ∈ R and w ≥Ra v. Lemma 2 now implies w ∼a v, and hence
M,v |= ψ. Since (v, v′) ∈ R, the induction hypothesis gives us M,v′ |= ψ, and we are done.
Now consider the case ϕ = Bγaψ. This case is more involved. Assume M,w |= B
γ
aψ, that
is, M,v |= ψ for all v ∈ Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a). Letting v
′ ∈ Mina(JγKM ∩ [w
′]a), we need to show
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M,v′ |= ψ (if Mina(JγKM ∩ [w
′]a) is empty there is nothing to show). We will first find a y in
Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a), then find a y
′ with (y, y′) ∈ R, and only then apply [back≥] to y
′ ≥Ra v
′
to produce the required v. The point is that our choice of y in Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a) will ensure
that v is in Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a).
As mentioned, we want to start out choosing a y in Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a), so we need to
ensure that this set is non-empty. By choice of v′ we have v′ ∈ JγKM and v
′ ∼a w
′. From
v′ ∼a w
′ we get that w′ ≥Ra v
′ or w′ ≤Ra v
′, using Lemma 2. Since also (w,w′) ∈ R, we can
apply [back≥] or [back≤] to get a u such that (u, v
′) ∈ R and either w ≥Ra u or w ≤
R
a u. From
(u, v′) ∈ R and v′ ∈ JγKM , we get u ∈ JγKM , using the induction hypothesis. From the fact
that either w ≥Ra u or w ≤
R
a u we get w ∼a u, using Lemma 2. Hence we have u ∈ JγKM∩[w]a.
This shows the set JγKM ∩ [w]a to be non-empty. Hence also Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a) is non-empty,
and we are free to choose a y in that set. Since y ∼a w, Lemma 2 gives us that either y ≥
R
a w
or w ≥Ra y, so we can apply [forth≤] or [forth≥] to find a y
′ with (y, y′) ∈ R and either
y′ ≥Ra w
′ or w′ ≥Ra y
′.
Claim 1. y′ ≥Ra v
′.
Proof of claim 1. We need to prove Mina([y
′]R= ∩ [y
′]a) ≥a Mina([v
′]R= ∩ [v
′]a). We first
prove that [y′]R= ∩ [y
′]a ⊆ JγKM ∩ [w
′]a:
• [y′]R= ∩ [y
′]a ⊆ JγKM : Assume y
′′ ∈ [y′]R= ∩ [y
′]a. Then (y
′, y′′) ∈ R=. Since we also
have (y, y′) ∈ R, we get (y, y′′) ∈ R=. From (y, y′′) ∈ R= and y ∈ JγKM a finite sequence
of applications of the induction hypothesis gives us y′′ ∈ JγKM .
• [y′]R= ∩ [y
′]a ⊆ [w
′]a: Assume y
′′ ∈ [y′]R= ∩ [y
′]a. Then y
′′ ∼a y
′. Since we have either
y′ ≥Ra w
′ or w′ ≥Ra y
′, we must also have y′ ∼a w
′, by Lemma 2. Hence y′′ ∼a y
′ ∼a w
′
implying y′′ ∈ [w′]a.
Since v′ is chosen minimal in JγKM∩[w
′]a and [y
′]R=∩[y
′]a ⊆ JγKM∩[w
′]a we get Mina([y
′]R=∩
[y′]a) ≥a {v
′} ≥a Mina([v
′]R= ∩ [v
′]a), as required. This concludes the proof of the claim.
By choice of y′ we have (y, y′) ∈ R, and by Claim 1 we have y′ ≥Ra v
′. We can now finally, as
promised, apply [back≥] to these premises to get a v s.t. (v, v
′) ∈ R and y ≥Ra v.
Claim 2. Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a) ⊆ Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a).
Proof of claim 2. Let x ∈ Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a). We need to prove x ∈ Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a). We
do this by proving x ∈ JγKM , x ∈ [w]a and {x} ≤a Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a):
• x ∈ JγKM : By choice of x we have (v, x) ∈ R
=. From (v, x) ∈ R= and (v, v′) ∈ R we get
(v′, x) ∈ R=. From (v′, x) ∈ R= and v′ ∈ JγKM a finite sequence of applications of the
induction hypothesis gives us x ∈ JγKM .
• x ∈ [w]M : By choice of x we have x ∼a v. Since y ≥
R
a v, Lemma 2 implies v ∼a y. By
choice of y we have y ∼a w, so in total we get x ∼a v ∼a y ∼a w, as required.
• {x} ≤a Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a):
{x} ≤a Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a) by choice of x
≤a Mina([y]R= ∩ [y]a) since y ≥
R
a v
≤a {y}
≤a Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a) since y ∈ Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a).
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This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now we are finally ready to prove M,v′ |= ψ. Let z ∈ Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a). Then z ∈
Mina(JγKM ∩ [w]a), by Claim 2. Hence M,z |= ψ, by assumption. Since (v, z) ∈ R
= and
(v, v′) ∈ R we get (z, v′) ∈ R=, and hence a finite sequence of applications of the induction
hypothesis gives us M,v′ |= ψ.
We proceed now to show the converse, that modal equivalence with regard to LC implies
bisimulation. The proof has the same structure as the Hennessy-Millner approach, though
appropriately modified for our purposes. Given a pair of image-finite models M and M ′,
the standard approach is to construct a relation R ⊆ D(M) × D(M ′) s.t. (w,w′) ∈ R if
M,w ≡M ′, w′. Using ♦-formulas, it is then shown that R fulfils the requirements for being a
bisimulation, as such formulas denote what is true at worlds accessible by whatever accessi-
bility relation is used in the model. This means that modally equivalent worlds have modally
equivalent successors, which is then used to show that R fulfils the required conditions. For
our purposes this will not do, as we only have K̂a-formulas (i.e. for ∼a). Instead, our equiv-
alent to ♦-formulas are of the form B̂ψa ϕ, each such formula corresponding to accessibility to
the most plausible ψ-worlds from all worlds in an equivalence class. What we want are for-
mulas corresponding to specific links between worlds, so we first establish that such formulas
exists. We thus have formulas with the same function as ♦-formulas serve in the standard
approach.
Proposition 5. Modal equivalence with respect to LC implies bisimilarity.
Proof. Assume (M1, w) ≡
C (M2, w
′). We wish to show that (M1, w)↔(M2, w
′). Let M =
M1 ⊔M2 be the disjoint union of M1 and M2. We then need to show that Q = {(v, v
′) ∈
D(M) × D(M) | M,v ≡C M,v′} is an autobisimulation on M . Note that as ≡C is an
equivalence relation, so is Q. We first show that ♦-like formulas talking about the ≥Qa -
relations between specific worlds in M exist.
Claim 1. Let w and w′ be worlds of the model M = (W,≥, V ) where w ≥Qa w′. Further
let ϕ ∈ LC be any formula true in w′. There then exists a formula ψ ∈ LC such that
([w]Q ∪ [w
′]Q) ∩ [w]a = JψKM ∩ [w]a and M,w |= B̂
ψ
a ϕ.
Proof of Claim 1. If two worlds s and s′ are not modally equivalent, there exists some
distinguishing formula Ψs,s′ with M,s |= Ψs,s′ and M,s
′ 6|= Ψs,s′. As ∼a is image-finite (since
both ≥a and its converse are) the following formula is finite:
Ψt =
∧
{Ψt,t′ | t ∼a t
′ ∧ (t, t′) 6∈ Q}
The formula Ψt distinguishes t from all the worlds in [t]a that it is not modally equivalent to.
If there are no such worlds, Ψt is the empty conjunction equivalent to ⊤.
We now return to our two original worlds w and w′. With the assumption thatM,w′ |= ϕ,
we show that ψ = Ψw∨Ψw′ is a formula of the kind whose existence we claim. First note that
JΨwKM ∩ [w]a contains only those worlds in [w]a that are modally equivalent to w, exactly
as [w]Q ∩ [w]a does. As JΨwKM ∪ JΨw′KM = JΨw ∨ Ψw′KM we have ([w]Q ∪ [w
′]Q) ∩ [w]a =
JΨw∨Ψw′KM∩[w]a. To getM,w |= B̂
ψ
a ϕ we need to show that ∃v ∈ Mina(JΨw ∨Ψw′KM∩[w]a)
s.t. M,v |= ϕ. Pick an arbitrary v ∈ Mina([w
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a). We will now show that this has the
required properties.
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Let T = JΨw∨Ψw′KM∩[w]a. Since T = ([w]Q∪[w
′]Q)∩[w]a, Lemma 1 gives u ≃
Q
a w or u ≃
Q
a
w′ for all u ∈ T . Together with w ≥Qa w′, this gives w′ ∈ Min≥Qa T . Choose u ∈ T arbitrarily.
We then have u ≥Qa w′ and, by definition, that Mina([u]Q ∩ [u]a) ≥a Mina([w
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a). By
choice of v we can then conclude {v} ≤a Mina([w
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a) ≤a Mina([u]Q ∩ [u]a) ≤a {u}. As
u was chosen arbitrarily in T , this shows v ∈ Mina T . As v ∈ [w
′]Q we have M,v ≡
C M,w′
and by assumption ofM,w′ |= ϕ thatM,v |= ϕ. We now have v ∈ Mina(JΨw ∨Ψw′KM ∩ [w]a)
and M,v |= ϕ, completing the proof of the claim.
We now proceed to show that Q fulfils the conditions for being an autobisimulation on M
(Definition 2). [atoms] is trivial. Next we show [forth≥]. Let (w,w
′) ∈ Q (i.e. (M,w) ≡C
(M,w′)) and w ≥Qa v. We then have that [forth≥] is fulfilled if ∃v
′ ∈ W , s.t. w′ ≥Qa v′ and
(v, v′) ∈ Q (i.e. (M,v) ≡C (M,v′)). To this end, we show that assuming for all v′ ∈ W ,
w′ ≥Qa v′ implies (M,v) 6≡C (M,v′) leads to a contradiction. This is analogous to how Q is
shown to be a bisimulation in standard Hennessy-Millner proofs.
We first show that ≥Qa is image-finite. First recall that by assumption on plausibility
models, ≥a is (pre)image finite, that is, both ≥a and ≤a are image-finite. It follows that
∼a = ≥a ∪ ≤a is image-finite as well. If a relation is image-finite, then so is any subset of the
relation. Therefore, as ≥Qa ⊆ ∼a, ≥
Q
a must be image-finite. Hence the set of ≥
Q
a -successors
of w′, S = {v′ | w′ ≥Qa v′} = {v′1, . . . , v
′
n} is also finite. Having assumed that v and none of
the v′is are modally equivalent, we have that there exists a number of distinguishing formulae
ϕv
′
i , one for each v′i, such thatM,v |= ϕ
v′i and M,v′i 6|= ϕ
v′i . Therefore, M,v |= ϕv
′
1 ∧· · ·∧ϕv
′
n .
For notational ease, let ϕ = ϕv
′
1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕv
′
n .
WithM,v |= ϕ, Claim 1 gives the existence of a formula ψ, such that ([w]Q∪[v]Q)∩[w]a =
JψKM ∩ [w]a and M,w |= B̂
ψ
a ϕ. Due to modal equivalence of w and w′, we must have
M,w′ |= B̂ψa ϕ. This we have iff ∃u′ ∈ Mina(JψKM ∩ [w
′]a), s.t. M,u
′ |= ϕ. By construction
of ϕ, no world v′i exists such that w
′ ≥Qa v′i and M,v
′
i |= ϕ, so we must have u
′ >
Q
a w
′. As
u′ ∈ [w′]a, the definition of >
Q
a gives Mina([u
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a) >a Mina([w
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a), so we get
∃w′′ ∈ Mina([w
′]Q ∩ [w
′]a) s.t. u
′ >a w
′′. As u′ ∈ Mina(JψKM ∩ [w
′]a), we must therefore
have w′′ 6∈ JψKM , and then also w
′ 6∈ JψKM . But as M,w |= ψ, we get the sought after
contradiction (we initially assumed (M,w) ≡C (M,w′)). We get [back≥] immediately from Q
being an equivalence relation.
Now we get to [forth≤]. Let (w,w
′) ∈ Q and w ≤Qa v. We have that [forth≤] is fulfilled if
∃v′ ∈W , s.t. w′ ≤Qa v′ and (v, v′) ∈ Q.
Claim 2. There exists a v′ ∈ [w′]a satisfying (v, v
′) ∈ Q.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose not. Then v does not have a modally equivalent world in [w′]a.
Thus there must be some formula ϕ holding in v that holds nowhere in [w′]a. Since v ∈ [w]a
(using Lemma 2), this implies thatM,w |= K̂aϕ andM,w
′ 6|= K̂aϕ. However, this contradicts
(w,w′) ∈ Q, concluding the proof of the claim.
Let v′ be chosen as guaranteed by Claim 2. It now suffices to show w′ ≤Qa v′. From (v, v′) ∈ Q
and v ≥Qa w, [forth≥] gives a w
′′ s.t. v′ ≥Qa w′′ and (w,w′′) ∈ Q. From v′ ≥
Q
a w
′′ we get
v′ ∼a w
′′, using Lemma 2. Since v′ ∈ [w′]a we further get w
′ ∼a v
′ ∼a w
′′. Since (w,w′′) ∈ Q
and (w,w′) ∈ Q we also get (w′, w′′) ∈ Q. From w′ ∼a w
′′ and (w′, w′′) ∈ Q Lemma 1 gives
us w′ ≃Qa w′′. From this and v′ ≥
Q
a w
′′ we get v′ ≥Qa w′ and hence w′ ≤
Q
a v
′, as required. This
concludes proof of [forth≤]. As for [back≥] getting to [back≤] is easy and left out.
15
Theorem 1 (Bisimulation characterisation for LC). Let (M,w), (M ′, w′) be plausibility mod-
els. Then:
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′)
Proof. From Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
We can now finally give the promised proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that neither the semantics of LC nor the proofs of Propo-
sition 4 and 5 rely on the existence of largest autobisimulations. Hence we can use these
in proving the proposition. Given a plausibility model M = (W,≥, V ) we define a relation
R by R = {(w, v) ∈ W 2 | M,w ≡C M,v}. Since modal equivalence implies bisimilarity
(Theorem 5), R is a bisimulation relation (indeed, R is exactly the relation shown to be an
autobisimulation in the proof of Proposition 5). Now we have to show that R is the largest
autobisimulation. If it was not, there would exist an autobisimulation R′ with R′−R 6= ∅. By
definition of R, R′ would then contain at least one pair (w, v) with M,w 6≡C M,v. However,
since bisimilarity implies modal equivalence (Proposition 4), this contradicts R′ being an au-
tobisimulation. Hence R must be the largest autobisimulation. It only remains to prove that
R is an equivalence relation. However, this is trivial given its definition in terms of modal
equivalence.
4.2 Bisimulation correspondence for degrees of belief
We now show bisimulation characterisation results for the logic of degrees of belief LD. Let
M = (W,≥, V ). Recalling Definition 7, for some world w ∈ W , the set Min0a[w]a contains
the minimal worlds with respect to a in the ∼a-equivalence class of w. For a given w
and a, we refer to the generalised definition Minna [w]a as (belief) sphere n of w for a. The
distinction between Minna and Mina is important to keep straight! The former Min—used to
give semantics of the Bna modality of L
D—is with respect to the relation a. The latter Min
is with respect to ≥a, used to give the semantics of L
C . Dealing as we do in this section with
LD, we first state some necessary observations about the properties of what we call beliefs
spheres. When convenient we will simply say that v is in (belief) sphere n for a, understanding
that this actually means v ∈ Minna [v]a.
It follows easily from the definitions, that for any world w, sphere n for a is wholly
contained within sphere n+ 1 for a, i.e. Minna [w]a ⊆ Min
n+1
a [w]a.
Lemma 4. Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model and consider w, v ∈W . If w ∼a v and
w 6∈ Minna [w]a, we have the following two properties:
(i) If v ∈ Minna [w]a, then w ≻a v.
(ii) If v ∈Minn+1a [w]a then w a v .
Proof. The truth of (i) easily comes from the definition of Minna . For (ii), we consider two
exhaustive cases for v. Either v ∈Minn+1a [w]a \Min
n
a [w]a in which case w a v follows from
a-minimality, since by assumption w ∈ [w]a \Min
n
a [w]a. Otherwise v ∈ Min
n
a [w]a, and so
from w 6∈Minna [w]a and (i) it follows that w ≻a v and hence also w a v.
Now getting to the meat of this section, showing bisimulation correspondence for LD, we
first show that bisimilar worlds belong to spheres of all the same degrees.
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Lemma 5. If (M1, w1)↔(M2, w2) then for all n ∈ N, w1 ∈ Min
n
a [w1]a iff w2 ∈ Min
n
a [w2]a.
Proof. Assume (M1, w1)↔(M2, w2). By definition there exists an autobisimulation R on the
disjoint union of M1 and M2 with (w1, w2) ∈ R. Using Proposition 1, let Rmax denote the
largest bisimulation on the disjoint union of M1 and M2 (so a=≥
Rmax
a ). Then R ⊆ Rmax.
We are going to show by contradiction that for any (w,w′) ∈ Rmax (which includes (w1, w2))
and n ∈ N, w ∈ Minna [w]a iff w
′ ∈ Minna [w
′]a. Suppose that this does not hold. Then there
must be some pair of worlds w and w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Rmax and either i) w ∈ Min
n
a [w]a
and w′ 6∈ Minna [w
′]a, or ii) w 6∈ Min
n
a [w]a and w
′ ∈ Minna [w
′]a for some n. Let n be the
smallest natural number for which we have either i) or ii). Because the cases are symmetrical,
we deal only with i). Using the alternative definition Minna [w]a = E
n
a [w]a ∪Min
n−1
a [w]a we
can deal with both n > 0 and n = 0 simultaneously.
By assumption of the smallest n we have w 6∈ Minn−1a [w]a, since w
′ 6∈ Minna [w
′]a implies
w′ 6∈ Minka[w
′]a for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n (so we could otherwise have chosen a smaller n). Therefore
w ∈ Ena [w]a and w
′ 6∈ Ena [w
′]a. Because w
′ ∈ [w′] \ Minna [w
′]a, we know that n is not the
maximum degree, so there must be some world v′ ∈ Ena [w
′]a which by definition means
that v′ 6∈ Minn−1a [w
′]a. With v
′ ∈ Ena [w
′]a ⊆ Min
n
a [w
′]a and and w
′ 6∈ Minna [w
′]a, Lemma
4 gives w′ ≻a v
′, i.e. w′ a v
′ and v′ 6a w
′. By [back≥] there is a v s.t. w a v and
(v, v′) ∈ Rmax. Because v
′ 6∈ Minn−1a [w
′]a we cannot have v ∈ Min
n−1
a [w]a, as we could
then again have chosen a smaller n making either i) or ii) true. Thus v ∈ [w]a \Min
n−1
a [w]a.
As w ∈ Minna [w]a, Lemma 4 gives v a w, so by [forth≥] there is a u
′ s.t. v′ a u
′ and
(w, u′) ∈ Rmax.
With (w,w′) ∈ Rmax and (w, u
′) ∈ Rmax, we have (w
′, u′) ∈ Rmax. As w
′ ∼a u
′ (we have
w′ a v
′ and v′ a u
′), Lemma 1 gives w′ ≃Rmaxa u
′, i.e. w′ a u
′ and w′ a u
′. As w′ 6∈
Minna [w
′]a, we then have u
′ 6∈ Minna [w
′]a. As u
′ 6∈ Minna [w
′]a while v
′ ∈ Ena [w
′]a ⊆ Min
n
a [w
′]a,
Lemma 4 then gives u′ ≻a v
′. But this contradicts v′ a u
′, concluding the proof.
Proposition 6. Bisimilarity implies modal equivalence for LD.
Proof. Assume (M1, w1)↔(M2, w2). Let M = (W,≥, V ) denote the disjoint union of M1 and
M2. Then there exists an autobisimulation R on M with (w1, w2) ∈ R. Using Proposition 1,
let Rmax denote the largest autobisimulation on M . Then R ⊆ Rmax. We need to prove that
(M,w1) ≡
D (M,w2).
We will show that for all (w,w′) ∈ Rmax, for all ϕ ∈ L
D, M,w |= ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ (which
then also means that it holds for all (w,w′) ∈ R). We proceed by induction on the syntactic
complexity of ϕ. The propositional and knowledge cases are already covered by Proposition 4,
so we only go for ϕ = Bnaψ.
Assume M,w |= Bnaψ. We need to prove that M,w
′ |= Bnaψ, that is M,v
′ |= ψ for all
v′ ∈ Minna [w
′]a. Picking an arbitrary v
′ ∈ Minna [w
′]a, we have [w
′]a = [v
′]a from Lemma 2,
and either w′ a v
′ or w′ a v
′ (so we also have v′ ∈ Minna [v
′]a). Using [back≥] or [back≤] as
appropriate, we get that there is a v such that w a v or w a v, and (v, v
′) ∈ Rmax. From
this, v′ ∈ Minna [v
′]a, and Lemma 5 we get v ∈ Min
n
a [v]a, allowing us to conclude v ∈ Min
n
a [w]a
from [w]a = [v]a. With the original assumption of M,w |= B
n
aψ we get M,v |= ψ. As
(v, v′) ∈ Rmax, the induction hypothesis gives M,v
′ |= ψ. As v′ was chosen arbitrarily in
Minna [w
′]a this gives M,w
′ |= Bnaψ. Showing that M,w
′ |= Bnaψ implies M,w |= B
n
aψ is
completely symmetrical and therefore left out.
We now get to showing that modal equivalence for the language of degrees of belief im-
plies bisimilarity. Trouble is, that the Bna modality uses the largest autobisimulation for
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deriving the relation a. This makes it difficult to go the Hennessy-Millner way of showing
by contradiction that the modal equivalence relation Q is an autobisimulation.
Instead, we establish that modal equivalence for LD implies modal equivalence for LC .
We go about this by way of a model and world dependent translation of LC formulas into LD
formulas (Definition 10). This translation has two properties. First, the translated formula
is true at M,w iff the untranslated formula is (Lemma 7)—a quite uncontroversial property.
More precisely, letting M = (W,≥, R) be a plausibility model, then for any w ∈ W , γ ∈ LC
where σM,w(γ) is the translation at M,w: M,w |= γ ⇔ M,w |= σM,w(γ). Assume further
that we have some M ′, w′ such that (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′). As σM,w(γ) is a formula of L
D we
can conclude M ′, w′ |= σM,w(γ). So in all we get that
M,w |= γ ⇔M,w |= σM,w(γ)⇔M
′, w′ |= σM,w(γ) (*)
The second property is that the translation of γ is the same for worlds modally equivalent
for LD (Lemma 8): If (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) then σM,w(γ) = σM ′,w′(γ). This then gives
M ′, w′ |= σM,w(γ)⇔M
′, w′ |= σM ′,w′(γ)⇔M
′, w′ |= γ (**)
Combining (*) and (**) gives that if (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) thenM,w |= γ iffM ′, w′ |= γ for any
γ ∈ LC , i.e. that (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′). As shown in the previous section, modal equivalence
for LC implies bisimilarity (Proposition 5), and we can therefore finally conclude that modal
equivalence for LD implies bisimilarity (Proposition7).
Lemma 6. For a plausibility model M , a world w ∈ D(M), agent a ∈ A and a formula ψ of
LC , if JψKM ∩ [w]a 6= ∅, there is a unique natural number k for which Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ⊆
Eka [w]a (= Mina([w]a \Min
k−1
a [w]a)).
Proof. Let S = JψKM ∩ [w]a. We first show that all worlds in Mina S are equiplausible with
respect to a.
Take any two worlds v1, v2 ∈ Mina S. We wish to show v1 ≃
R
a v2, i.e. Mina([v1]R ∩
[v1]a) ≃a Mina([v2]R∩[v2]a), whereR is the largest autobisimulation onM . With Proposition4
(bisimilarity implies modal equivalence for LC) and for i = 1, 2, we have that [vi]R ⊆ JψKM .
Hence [vi]R∩[vi]a = [vi]R∩[w]a ⊆ JψKM∩[w]a = S. With vi ∈ Mina S and vi ∈ [vi]R∩[vi]a ⊆ S,
we have vi ∈ Mina([vi]R ∩ [vi]a) (if an element of a set A is minimal in a set B ⊇ A, then
it is also minimal in A). From this we can conclude that Mina([vi]R ∩ [vi]a) ≃a {vi}. Since
v1 ≃a v2 we get Mina([v1]R ∩ [v1]a) ≃a {v1} ≃a {v2} ≃a Mina([v2]R ∩ [v2]a), concluding the
proof that v1 ≃
R
a v2.
Due to (pre)image-finiteness ofM , [w]a is finite. This means that for any v ∈ [w]a there is a
unique natural number k for which v ∈ Eka [w]a. As all worlds in Mina S are a-equiplausible,
we have that Mina S ⊆ E
k
a [w]a for some unique k.
Having established that if JψKM ∩ [w]a 6= ∅ then there does indeed exist a unique k st.
Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ⊆ E
k
a [w]a, we have that the following translation is well-defined.
Definition 10 (Translation σM,w). Let M = (W,≥, V ) be a plausibility model and γ ∈ L
C
be given. We write σM,w(γ) for the translation of γ at M,w into a formula of L
D defined as
follows:
σM,w(p) = p
σM,w(¬ϕ) = ¬σM,w(ϕ)
σM,w(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = σM,w(ϕ1) ∧ σM,w(ϕ2)
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σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) =
{
Bka
∨
{σM,v(ψ → ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a} ∧ B̂
k
a
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} if JψKM ∩ [w]a 6= ∅
Ka
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} if JψKM ∩ [w]a = ∅
where k is the natural number such that Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ⊆ E
k
a [w]a. As Kaϕ is definable
in LC as B¬ϕa ⊥, we need no Kaϕ-case in the translation.
We need (pre)image-finiteness of M because the translation of σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) is based on
either [w]a or Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a). For σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) to be finite, we need finiteness of [w]a.
We now get to showing the first of the promised properties of the translation, namely that
the translated formula is true at M,w iff the untranslated formula is.
Lemma 7. Given a plausibility model M = (W,≥, V ) and γ ∈ LC we have M,w |= γ iff
M,w |= σM,w(γ) for all w ∈W .
Proof. We show both directions by induction on the modal depth of γ. For the base case of
a modal depth of 0, we have σM,w(γ) = γ easily, giving M,w |= γ iff M,w |= σM,w(γ). The
p-, ¬-, ∧-cases being quite easy, we deal only with γ = Bψa ϕ in the induction step. For that
case there are to subcases; whether σM,w(γ) is a Ka-formula or not.
(⇒) : M,w |= γ implies M,w |= σM,w(γ).
Take first the case JψKM ∩ [w]a = ∅ where σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) = Ka
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}. If
JψKM ∩ [w]a = ∅, then M,v |= ¬ψ for all v ∈ [w]a. Applying the induction hypothesis gives
M,v |= σM,v(¬ψ) for all v ∈ [w]a. Then we also have M,u |=
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} for all
u ∈ [w]a and finally M,w |= Ka
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}.
Now take the case JψKM ∩ [w]a 6= ∅. Letting S = Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) and k be chosen
as in the translation, i.e. such that S ⊆ Eka [w]a, we wish to prove that M,w |= B
ψ
a ϕ
implies M,w |= Bka
∨
{σM,v(ψ → ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a} ∧ B̂
k
a
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}. We first show
M,w |= B̂ka
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}. Because M,v |= ψ for all v ∈ S, the induction hypothesis
gives M,v |= σM,v(ψ) for all v ∈ S. From this we can conclude M,u |=
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ S}
for all u ∈ S, and thus also M,u |=
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} for all u ∈ S. From Lemma 6 we
have S ⊆ Minka[w]a, so M,u |=
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} for some u ∈ Min
k
a[w]a. This gives
M,w |= B̂ka
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}. Next is M,w |= B
k
a
∨
{σM,v(ψ → ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a}.
Claim. If M,w |= Bψa ϕ, then for all v ∈ Eka [w]a ∩ JψKM , M,v |= ϕ.
Proof of claim. We show the claim by contradiction, assuming that at least one world in
Eka [w]a ∩ JψKM is a ¬ϕ-world. Let v be this ψ ∧ ¬ϕ-world. As v ∈ E
k
a [w]a, we have
{v} ≃Rmaxa E
k
a [w]a ≃
Rmax
a S, and specifically that ∀s ∈ S : v ≃
Rmax
a s. This means ∀s ∈
S : Min([v]Rmax ∩ [v]a) ≃a Mina([s]Rmax ∩ [s]a). Because ∀s ∈ S : Mina([s]Rmax ∩ [s]a) ≃a S,
we have Min([v]Rmax ∩ [v]a) ≃a S and thus some v
′ ∈ Min([v]Rmax ∩ [v]a) such that {v
′} ≃a S.
Combining v′ ∈ [v]Rmax with Theorem 1 gives M,v ≡
C M,v′ and thus that M,v′ |= ψ ∧ ¬ϕ.
Putting v′ ∈ JψKM together with {v
′} ≃a S, means that v
′ ∈ S. As M,v′ |= ¬ϕ, we have a
contradiction of M,w |= Bψa ϕ, concluding the proof of the claim.
With M,w |= Bψa ϕ, we now have M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Eka [w]a ∩ JψKM , and thus M,v |=
ψ → ϕ for all v ∈ Eka [w]a. Lemma 6 gives S ⊆ E
k
a [w]a, and by definition we have E
k
a [w]a ∩
Mink−1a [w]a = ∅, that is, there are no ψ-worlds below layer k, so M,v |= ψ → ϕ for all v ∈
Minka[w]a. Using the induction hypothesis gives M,v |= σM,v(ψ → ϕ) for all v ∈ Min
k
a[w]a
and therefore M,w |= Bka
∨
{σM,v(ψ → ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a}, finalising left-to-right direction of the
proof.
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(⇐) : M,w |= σM,w(γ) implies M,w |= γ.
We show the stronger claim thatM,w |= σM,w′(γ) for some w
′ ∈ D(M) impliesM,w |= γ.
Let γ = Bψa ϕ and suppose that M,w |= σM,w′(γ) for some w
′ ∈ D(M). We then need to
show M,w |= Bψa ϕ. First take the case where JψKM ∩ [w
′]a = ∅. Then σM,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ) =
Ka
∨
{σM,v′(¬ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}, i.e. M,w |= Ka
∨
{σM,v′(¬ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}. This means that
M,v |=
∨
{σM,v′(¬ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} for all v ∈ [w]a, i.e. for any v ∈ [w]a there is a v
′ ∈ [w′]a
such that M,v |= σM,v′(¬ψ). Applying the induction hypothesis, we get M,v |= ¬ψ for all
v ∈ [w]a. Thus JψKM ∩ [w]a = ∅ and we trivially have M,w |= B
ψ
a ϕ.
Now take the case JψKM ∩ [w
′]a 6= ∅. Letting S
′ = Mina(JψKM ∩ [w
′]a) and k
′ be s.t. S′ ⊆
Ek
′
a [w
′]a, we have M,w |= B
k′
a
∨
{(σM,v′(ψ → ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} ∧ B̂
k′
a
∨
{σM,v′(ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}.
FromM,w |= Bk
′
a
∨
{σM,v′(ψ → ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} we haveM,v |=
∨
{σM,v′(ψ → ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}
for all v ∈ Mink
′
a [w]a, i.e. for any v ∈ [w]a there is a v
′ ∈ [w′]a such thatM,v |= σM,v′(ψ → ϕ).
Applying the induction hypothesis, we get M,v |= ψ → ϕ for all v ∈ Mink
′
a [w]a. From
M,w |= B̂k
′
a
∨
{σM,v′(ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} we have M,v |=
∨
{σM,v′(ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} for some
v ∈ Mink
′
a [w]a, i.e. there is a v ∈ [w]a and a v
′ ∈ [w′]a such that M,v |= σM,v′(ψ). Applying
the induction hypothesis gets usM,v |= ψ. Thus we have M,w |= Bk
′
a (ψ → ϕ)∧ B̂
k′
a ψ (where
ψ,ϕ ∈ LC).
From M,w |= B̂k
′
a ψ we have that JψKM ∩ [w]a 6= ∅, so Lemma 6 gives the existence of
a k, s.t. Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ⊆ Min
k
a[w]a. We also have from M,w |= B̂
k′
a ψ that k ≤ k
′,
so Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ⊆ Min
k′
a [w]a. With M,w |= B
k′
a (ψ → ϕ) we get M,v |= ψ → ϕ
for all v ∈ Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a), then M,v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a), and finally
M,w |= Bψa ϕ.
We have now gotten to the second of the two promised properties; that the translation is
the same for worlds modally equivalent for LD.
Lemma 8. Given plausibility models M and M ′, for any w ∈ D(M) and w′ ∈ D(M ′), if
(M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) then for any formula γ ∈ LC , σM,w(γ) = σM ′,w′(γ).
Proof. We show this by another induction on the modal depth of γ. For the base case of
modal depth 0 we trivially have σM,w(γ) = σM ′,w′(γ).
For the induction step we, as before, only deal with γ = Bψa ϕ. Note first that every world in
[w]a is modally equivalent to at least one world in [w
′]a. If that wasn’t the case, there would
be some LD-formula ϕ true somewhere in [w]a and nowhere in [w
′]a. Then M,w |= K̂aϕ
while M ′, w′ 6|= K̂aϕ, contradicting (M,w) ≡
D (M ′, w′). A completely analogous argument
gives that every world in [w′]a is modally equivalent to at least one world in [w]a. Thus
JψKM ∩ [w]a = ∅ iff JψK
′
M ∩ [w
′]a = ∅. We thus have two cases, either both σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) and
σM ′,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ) are Ka-formulas, or both are B
k
a -formulas.
We deal first with the case where both translations are Ka-formulas. Here we have
σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) = Ka
∨
{σM,v(¬ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a} and σM ′,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ) = Ka
∨
{σM ′,v′(¬ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}.
As already shown, for all v ∈ [w]a there is a v
′ ∈ [w′]a such that (M,w) ≡
D (M ′, v′), and vice
versa. The induction hypothesis gives σM,v(¬ϕ) = σM ′,v′(¬ϕ) for all these vs and v
′s. Then∨
{σM,v(¬ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a} =
∨
{σM ′,v′(¬ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} and thus σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) = σM ′,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ).
Take now the case where both translations are Bka -formulas. A similar argument as above
gives
∨
{σM,v(ψ → ϕ) | v ∈ [w]a} =
∨
{σM ′,v′(ψ → ϕ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a} and
∨
{σM,v(ψ) | v ∈
[w]a} =
∨
{σM ′,v′(ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}. Letting k and k
′ be the indices chosen in the translation
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of σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) and σM ′,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ) respectively, we have σM,w(B
ψ
a ϕ) = σM ′,w′(B
ψ
a ϕ) if k = k′.
Assume towards a contradiction that k > k′. Lemma 6 now gives Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a) ∩
Mink
′
a [w]a = ∅, soM,v |= ¬ψ for all v ∈Min
k′
a [w]a. With Lemma 7 we haveM,v |= σM,v(¬ψ)
for all v ∈ Mink
′
a [w]a and thus also that M,w |= B
k′
a
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a}. From Lemma
6 we also have Mina(JψKM ∩ [w
′]a) ⊆ Min
k′
a [w
′]a, so M
′, v′ 6|= ¬ψ for some v′ ∈ Mink
′
a [w
′]a.
From here we use Lemma 7 to conclude M ′, v′ 6|= σM ′,v′(¬ψ) for some v
′ ∈ Mink
′
a [w
′]a and
thus M ′, w′ 6|= Bk
′
a
∨
{σM ′,v′(¬ψ) | v
′ ∈ [w′]a}. By the work done so far, this also means
M ′, w′ 6|= Bk
′
a
∨
{σM,v(¬ψ) | v ∈ [w]a} which contradicts (M,w) ≡
D (M ′, w′). The case when
k′ > k is completely symmetrical, and the proof if thus concluded.
Proposition 7. Modal equivalence for LD implies bisimilarity.
Proof. Let M = (W,≥, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′) be two plausibility models. We first show
that if (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) then (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′). Assume (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w,′ ) and let γ
be any formula of LC .
M,w |= γ ⇔M,w |= σM,w(γ) (Lemma 7)
⇔M ′, w′ |= σM,w(γ) (by assumption)
⇔M ′, w′ |= σM ′,w′(γ) (Lemma 8)
⇔M ′, w′ |= γ (Lemma 7)
Putting this together with Theorem 5 (modal equivalence for LC implies bisimilarity), we
have that two worlds which are modally equivalent in LD are also modally equivalent in LC
and therefore bisimilar.
Theorem 2 (Bisimulation characterisation for LD). Let (M,w), (M ′, w′) be plausibility mod-
els. Then:
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′)
Proof. From Proposition 6 and Proposition 7.
4.3 Bisimulation correspondence for safe belief
We now show bisimulation characterisation results for the logic of degrees of belief LS .
Proposition 8. Bisimilarity implies modal equivalence for LS.
Proof. AssumeM1↔M2. Then there is an autobisimulation R
′ on the disjoint unionM1⊔M2
with R′ ∩ (D(M1)×D(M2)) 6= ∅. Extend R
′ into the largest autobisimulation R on M1 ⊔M2
(using Proposition 1). Define R1 = R ∩ (D(M1)×D(M1)) and R2 = R ∩ (D(M2)×D(M2)).
Claim. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and w ∈ D(Mi). Then
(i) Ri is the largest autobisimulation on Mi.
(ii) Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) =Mina([w]R=i ∩ [w]a).
(iii) For any v, w ≥Ra v iff w ≥
Ri
a v.
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Proof of claim. To prove (i), let Si denote the largest autobisimulation on Mi. If we can
show Si ⊆ Ri we are done. Since Si is an autobisimulation on Mi, it must also be an
autobisimulation on M1 ⊔M2. Thus, clearly, Si ⊆ R, since R is the largest autobisimulation
on M1 ⊔M2. Hence, since Si ⊆ D(Mi) × D(Mi), we get Si = Si ∩ (D(Mi) × D(Mi)) ⊆
R ∩ (D(Mi)×D(Mi)) = Ri. This shows Si ⊆ Ri, as required.
We now prove (ii). Since w ∈ D(Mi) we get [w]a ⊆ D(Mi). Since Ri = R ∩ (D(Mi) ×
D(Mi)) this implies [w]R ∩ [w]a = [w]Ri ∩ [w]a. Now note that since R is the largest auto-
bisimulation on M1 ⊔M2 and Ri is the largest autobisimulation on Mi, we have R = R
= and
Ri = R
=
i , by Proposition 1 (the largest autobisimulation is an equivalence relation). Hence
from [w]R ∩ [w]a = [w]Ri ∩ [w]a we can conclude [w]R= ∩ [w]a = [w]R=i ∩ [w]a, and then finally
Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) = Mina([w]R=i ∩ [w]a).
We now prove (iii). Note that if w ≥Ra v or w ≥
Ri
a then w ∼a v (by Lemma 2). So in
proving w ≥Ra v ⇔ w ≥
Ri
a v for w ∈ D(Mi), we can assume that also v ∈ D(Mi). We then
get:
w ≥Ra v ⇔ Mina([w]R= ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R= ∩ [v]a)
⇔ Mina([w]R=i ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R=i ∩ [v]a) by (ii), since w, v ∈ D(Mi)
⇔ w ≥Ria v.
This completes the proof of the claim.
We will now show that for all ϕ and all (w1, w2) ∈ R ∩ (D(M1) × D(M2)), if M1, w1 |= ϕ
then M2, w2 |= ϕ (the other direction being symmetric). The proof is by induction on the
syntactic complexity of ϕ. The propositional and knowledge cases are already covered by
Proposition 4, so we only need to consider the case ϕ = aψ. Hence assume M1, w1 |= aψ
and (w1, w2) ∈ R ∩ (D(M1) ×D(M2)). We need to prove M2, w2 |= aψ. Pick an arbitrary
v2 ∈ D(M2) with w2 a v2. If we can show M2, v2 |= ψ, we are done. By (i), R2 is the largest
autobisimulation on M2. Hence w2 a v2 by definition means w2 ≥
R2
a v2. Using (iii), we
can from w2 ≥
R2
a v2 conclude w2 ≥
R
a v2. Since R is an autobisimulation, we can now apply
[back≥] to (w1, w2) ∈ R and w2 ≥
R
a v2 to get a v1 with w1 ≥
R
a v1 and (v1, v2) ∈ R. Using (iii)
again we can conclude from w1 ≥
R
a v1 to w1 ≥
R1
a v1, since w1 ∈ D(M1). By (i), R1 is the
largest autobisimulation on M1, so w1 ≥
R1
a v1 is by definition the same as w1 a v1. Since
we have assumed M1, w1 |= aψ, and since w1 a v1, we get M1, v1 |= ψ. Since (v1, v2) ∈ R,
the induction hypothesis gives us M2, v2 |= ψ, and we are done.
As for the previous logics, the converse also holds, that is, modal equivalence with regard
to LS implies bisimulation. This is going to be proved as follows. First we prove that any
conditional belief formula ϕC can be translated into a logically equivalent safe belief formula
ϕS . This implies that if two pointed models (M,w) and (M
′, w′) are modally equivalent in LS ,
they must also be modally equivalent in LC : Any formula ϕC ∈ L
C is true in (M,w) iff its
translation ϕS ∈ L
S is true in (M,w) iff ϕS is true in (M
′, w′) iff ϕC is true in (M
′, w′). Now
we can reason as follows: If two pointed models (M,w) and (M ′, w′) are modally equivalent
in LS then they are modally equivalent in LC and hence, by Theorem 5, bisimilar. This is the
result we were after. We postpone the full proof until Section 5.1, which is where we provide
the translation of conditional belief formulas into safe belief formulas (as part of a systematic
investigation of the relations between the different languages and their relative expressivity).
Here we only state the result:
Proposition 9. Modal equivalence for LS implies bisimilarity.
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Proof. See Section 5.1.
As for the two previous languages, LC and LD, we now get the following bisimulation
characterisation result.
Theorem 3 (Bisimulation characterisation for LS). Let (M,w), (M ′, w′) be plausibility mod-
els. Then:
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡S (M ′, w′)
Proof. From Proposition 8 and Proposition 9.
4.4 Combining characterisation results
By combining Theorems 1, 2 and 3 from the previous subsections we immediately have the
following result.
Corollary 1. Bisimilarity corresponds to modal equivalence in the logics of conditional belief,
degrees of belief, and safe belief, and in any logic containing two or all three of these belief
modalities; and modal equivalence in one of these logics corresponds to modal equivalence in
any other.
For example, we also have that (M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡CDS (M ′, w′), or that
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡DS (M ′, w′). Also, to be explicit, we now have that
• (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′)
• (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡S (M ′, w′)
• (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡S (M ′, w′)
In other words, the information content of a pointed plausibility model is equally well de-
scribed in any of these logics. This seems to suggest that it does not matter which logic you
use to describe the information content of such a model, apart from the usual considerations
of succinctness. Still, this is not the case: our logics are not equally expressive. This will now
be addressed in the next section.
5 Expressivity
In this section we will determine the expressivity hierarchy of the logics under consideration.
Abstractly speaking, expressivity is a yardstick for measuring whether two logics are able to
capture the same properties of a class of models. More concretely in our case, we will for
instance be interested in determining whether the conditional belief modality can be expressed
using the degrees of belief modality (observe that the translation in Section 4.2 depends on
a particular model). With such results at hand we can for instance justify the inclusion or
exclusion of a modality, and it also sheds light upon the strengths and weaknesses of our
doxastic notions. To start things off we now formally introduce the notion of expressivity
found in [40].
Definition 11. Let L and L′ be two logical languages interpreted on the same class of models.
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• For ϕ ∈ L and ϕ′ ∈ L′, we say that ϕ and ϕ′ are equivalent (ϕ ≡ ϕ′) iff they are true in
the same pointed models of said class.3
• L′ is at least as expressive as L (L ≦ L′) iff for every ϕ ∈ L there is a ϕ′ ∈ L′ s.t.
ϕ ≡ ϕ′.
• L and L′ are equally expressive (L ≡ L′) iff L ≦ L′ and L′ ≦ L.
• L′ is more expressive than L (L < L′) iff L ≦ L′ and L′ 6≦ L.
• L and L′ are incomparable (L ⊲⊳ L′) iff L 6≦ L′ and L′ 6≦ L.
Below we will show several cases where L 6≦ L′; i.e. that L′ is not at least as expressive
as L. Our primary modus operandi (obtained by logically negating L ≦ L′) will be to show
that there is a ϕ ∈ L, where for any ϕ′ ∈ L′ we can find two pointed models (M,w), (M ′, w′)
such that
M,w |= ϕ, M ′, w′ 6|= ϕ and (M,w |= ϕ′ ⇔M ′, w′ |= ϕ′)
In other words, for some ϕ ∈ L, no matter the choice of ϕ′ ∈ L′, there will be models which
ϕ distinguishes but ϕ′ does not, meaning that ϕ 6≡ ϕ′.
Our investigation will be concerned with the 7 distinct languages that are obtained by
considering each LX such that X is a non-empty subsequence of CDS. In Section 5.1 our
focus is on safe belief, and in Section 5.2 on degrees of belief. Using these results, we provide
in Section 5.3 a full picture of the relative expressivity of each of these logics, for instance
showing that we can formulate 5 distinct languages up to equal expressivity. We find this
particularly remarkable in light of the fact that our notion of bisimulation is the right fit for
all our logics.
5.1 Expressivity of Safe Belief
Our first result, Proposition 10, shows that the conditional belief modality can be expressed
in terms of the safe belief modality. Similar results can be found elsewhere in the literature,
for instance in [13, Fact 31] and [7]. In fact, the overall idea of reducing the binary conditional
belief operator to a unary belief operator goes back to [11] and [21].
Below we prove that the identity found in [13] is also a valid identity in our logics, which
is not a given as our semantics differ in essential ways. In particular the semantics of safe
belief in [13] is a standard modality for ≥a, whereas our semantics uses the derived relation
a. A more in-depth account of this matter is provided in Section 6. Returning to the matter
at hand, we point out that our work in Section 4 actually serves our investigations here, as
evident from the crucial role of Proposition 4 in the following proof.
Proposition 10. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ LC . Then the formula B
ψ
a ϕ ↔ (K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧ a(ψ → ϕ)))
is valid.
Proof. We let M = (W,≥, V ) be any plausibility model with w ∈ W , and further let a
denote the normal plausibility relation for an agent a in M . We will show that M,w |=
B
ψ
a ϕ ↔ (K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧ a(ψ → ϕ))). To this end we let X = Mina(JψKM ∩ [w]a).
3With our usage of ≡ it is clear from context whether we’re referring to modal equivalence, formulas or
languages.
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Immediately we have that if X = ∅ then no world in [w]a satisfies ψ, thus trivially yielding
both M,w |= Bψa ϕ and M,w |= K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ)). For the remainder we therefore
assume X is non-empty. We now work under the assumption that M,w |= Bψa ϕ and show
that this implies M,w |= K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ)).
Claim 1. Let x ∈ X be arbitrarily chosen, then M,x |= ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ).
Proof of claim 1. From x ∈ X we have first that M,x |= ψ ∧ ϕ and w ∼a x. Since
M,x |= ψ this means we have proven Claim 1 if M,x |= a(ψ → ϕ) can be shown. To
that effect, consider any y ∈ W s.t. x a y, for which we must prove M,y |= ψ → ϕ.
When M,y 6|= ψ this is immediate, and so we may assume M,y |= ψ. Since x a y we
have Mina([x]R= ∩ [x]a) ≥a Mina([y]R= ∩ [y]a) with R being the largest autobisimulation on
M . As R is an autobisimulation we have worlds x′, y′ in M such that (y, y′) ∈ R, x ≥a x
′
and x′ ≥a y
′. Applying Proposition 4 and M,y |= ψ it follows that M,y′ |= ψ. Using ≥a-
transitivity we have x ≥a y
′ and hence w ∼a x ∼a y
′, allowing the conclusion that y′ ∈ X.
By assumption this means M,y′ |= ψ ∧ϕ, and so applying once more Proposition 4 it follows
that M,y |= ψ → ϕ thus completing the proof of this claim.
To show M,w |= K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ)) we take any x ∈ X, for which we have w ∼a x
by definition of X. Combining this with Claim 1 it follows that M,w |= K̂a(ψ∧a(ψ → ϕ)).
Consequently this also means that M,w |= K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ)), thus completing the
proof of this direction.
For the converse assume now that M,w |= K̂aψ → K̂a(ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ)). As X 6= ∅ there
is a world u ∈W s.t. w ∼a u and M,u |= ψ ∧a(ψ → ϕ). Therefore we have M,u
′ |= ψ → ϕ
for all u a u
′.
Claim 2. Let x ∈ X be arbitrarily chosen, then M,x |= ϕ.
Proof of claim 2. Since x ∈ X we have by definition that M,x |= ψ. It is sufficient to
prove that u a x because this implies M,x |= ψ → ϕ and hence M,x |= ϕ as required.
To show u a x we assume towards a contradiction that u 6a x. Now let R denote the
largest bisimulation on M and consider any x′ ∈ Mina([x]R= ∩ [x]a). As R
= and ∼a are both
reflexive, we have x ≥a x
′. From u 6a x we therefore have a u
′ ∈ Mina([u]R= ∩ [u]a) s.t.
u′ 6≥a x
′, u ∼a u
′ and (u, u′) ∈ R (thus also x′ >a u
′). Since u′ ∼a u and u ∼a w we have
also u′ ∼a w, and additionally from x ≥a x
′ and x′ >a u
′ we can conclude that x ≥a u
′ and
u′ 6≥a x. Using M,u |= ψ and (u, u
′) ∈ R we apply Proposition 4 which implies M,u′ |= ψ.
As x ∈ X, u′ ∼a w and x ≥a u
′ it must be the case that u′ ∈ X. From u′ 6≥a x we also have
that x 6∈ X, but this this contradicts our initial assumption that x ∈ X. We therefore have
u a x and hence that M,x |= ϕ which completes the proof of the claim.
Recalling that M,w |= Bψa ϕ iff M,x |= ϕ for all x ∈ X, Claim 2 readily shows this
direction, and thereby completes the proof.
This result shows there is an equivalence-preserving translation from formulas in LC to
formulas in LS, and so we have the following results.
Corollary 2. For any ϕ ∈ LC there is a formula ϕ′ ∈ LS s.t. ϕ ≡ ϕ′.
Corollary 3. LC ≦ LS, LS ≡ LCS and LDS ≡ LCDS.
From Corollary 3 we have that any expressivity result for LS also holds for LCS , and
similarly for LDS and LCDS. In other words, the conditional belief modality is superfluous in
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terms of expressivity when the safe belief modality is at our disposal. What is more, we can
now finally give a full proof of Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let (M,w) and (M ′, w′) be plausibility models which are modally
equivalent in LS . For any ϕC ∈ L
C it follows from Corollary 2 that there is a ϕS ∈ L
S s.t.
ϕC ≡ ϕS . Therefore
M,w |= ϕC ⇔M,w |= ϕS
≡S
⇐=⇒M ′, w′ |= ϕS ⇔M
′, w′ |= ϕC
and hence (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′). Using Proposition 5 we can conclude (M,w)↔(M ′, w′) as
required.
We now proceed to show that LCD is not at least as expressive as LS . In doing so we
need only work with A = {a}, meaning that the result holds even in the single-agent case.
This is also true for our results in Section 5.2.
Lemma 9. Let p, q be distinct symbols in P , and let M = (W,≥, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′)
denote the two plausibility models presented in Figure 5. Then for P ′ = P \ {q} we have that
(M,w3) ≡
CD
P ′ (M
′, w′3).
Proof. We prove the stronger result that for any ϕ ∈ LCDP ′ :
for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} : (M,wi |= ϕ)⇔ (M
′, w′i |= ϕ)
We proceed by induction on ϕ and let i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. When ϕ is a propositional symbol r in P ′,
we have that r 6= q and so r ∈ V (wi) iff r ∈ V
′(w′i), thus completing the base case. Negation
and conjunction are readily shown using the induction hypothesis.
For ϕ = Kaψ we have that M,wi |= Kaψ iff M,v |= ψ for all v ∈ {w1, w2, w3}, since
[wi]a = {w1, w2, w3}. Applying the induction hypothesis to each element this is equivalent
to M ′, v′ |= ψ for all v′ ∈ {w′1, w
′
2, w
′
3} iff M
′, w′i |= Kaψ (as [w
′
i]a = {w
′
1, w
′
2, w
′
3}), which
completes this case. Continuing to consider ϕ = Bγaψ we can simplify notation slightly,
namely Mina(JγKM ∩ [wi]a) = MinaJγKM since [wi]a =W . The same holds for each world w
′
i
of M ′.
Claim 1. For M and M ′ we have that wi ∈ MinaJγKM iff w
′
i ∈ MinaJγKM ′ .
Proof of Claim 1. For M we have that w3 >a w2 and w2 >a w1, and similarly w
′
3 >
′
a w
′
2 and
w′2 >
′
a w
′
1 for M
′. Thus the claim follows from the argument below.
wi ∈ MinaJγKM ⇔
M,wi |= γ and there is no j <a i s.t. M,wj |= γ
(IH)
⇐=⇒
M ′, w′i |= γ and there is no j <a i s.t. M
′, w′j |= γ ⇔
w′i ∈ MinaJγKM ′
We now have that M,wi |= B
γ
aψ iff M,v |= ψ for all v ∈ MinaJγKM . Applying both the
induction hypothesis and Claim 1, we have that this is equivalent to M,v′ |= ψ for all
v′ ∈ MinaJγKM ′ iff M
′, w′i |= B
γ
aψ.
Finally we consider the case of ϕ = Bnaψ. To this end we note that the union of {(w
′
1, w
′
3)}
and the identity relation on W is the largest bisimulation on M ′ (this relation cannot be
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Figure 5: Two single-agent plausibility models and their normal plausibility relations (dashed
arrows). As usual reflexive arrows are omitted.
extended and still satify [atoms]). As w′1 and w
′
3 are bisimilar, it follows from Corollary 1
that M ′, w′1 |= ψ iff M
′, w′3 |= ψ (∗).
Claim 2. For n ∈ N we have that M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ Minna [wi] iff M
′, w′ |= ψ for all
w′ ∈ Minna [w
′
i].
Proof of Claim 2. We treat three exhaustive cases for n.
• n = 0: M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ Min0a[wi] ⇔ M,w1 |= ψ
(IH)
⇐=⇒ M ′, w′1 |= ψ
(∗)
⇐⇒ M ′, w′3 |= ψ.
Therefore M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ Min0a[wi] is equivalent to M
′, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈
{w′1, w
′
3}, and as Min
0
a[w
′
i] = {w
′
1, w
′
3} this concludes this case.
• n = 1: Since Min1a[wi] = {w1, w2} we have that M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ {w1, w2}
(IH)
⇐=⇒
M ′, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈ {w′1, w
′
2}. Using (∗) this is equivalent to M
′, w′ |= ψ for all
w′ ∈ {w′1, w
′
2, w
′
3}. By this argument and the fact that Min
1
a[w
′
i] = {w
′
1, w
′
2, w
′
3}, we
can conclude M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ Min1a[wi] ⇔ M
′, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈ Min1a[w
′
i] as
required.
• n ≥ 2: We have that Minma [wi] = {w1, w2, w3} and Min
m
a [w
′
i] = {w
′
1, w
′
2, w
′
3}, hence this
is exactly as the case of ϕ = Kψ.
We have that M,wi |= B
n
aψ iff M,w |= ψ for all w ∈ Min
n
a [wi]. Applying Claim 2 this is
equivalent to M ′, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈ Minna [w
′
i] iff M
′, w′i |= B
n
aψ, thereby completing the
final case of the induction step. It follows that (M,w3) ≡
CD
P ′ (M
′, w′3) as required.
Proposition 11. LS 6≦ LCD.
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Proof. Consider the formula ♦ap of L
S with p ∈ P , and take some arbitrary formula ϕCD ∈
LCDP . As ϕCD is finite and P is countably infinite, there will be some q 6= p not occurring in
ϕCD. Letting P
′ = P \ {q} this means that ϕCD ∈ L
CD
P ′ . This choice of p and q can always
be made, and consequently there also exists models M and M ′ as given in Figure 5. The
largest bisimulation on M is the identity as no two worlds have the same valuation. At the
same time {(w′1, w
′
1), (w
′
1, w
′
3), (w
′
2, w
′
2), (w
′
3, w
′
1), (w
′
3, w
′
3)} is the largest bisimulation on M
′.
This gives rise to the normal plausibility relations a (for M) and 
′
a (for M
′) depicted in
Figure 5 using dashed edges.
Since w3 a w2 and M,w2 |= p it follows that M,w3 |= ♦ap. Furthermore we have that
the image of w′3 under 
′
a is {w
′
1, w
′
3}. This means that there is no v
′ ∈W ′ s.t. w′3 
′
a v
′ and
M ′, v′ |= p, and consequently M ′, w′3 6|= ♦ap. At the same time we have by Lemma 9 that
M,w3 |= ϕCD iff M
′, w′3 |= ϕCD. Therefore using the formula ♦ap of L
S, for any formula of
ϕCD ∈ L
CD there are models which ♦ap distinguishes but ϕCD does not, and so ♦ap 6≡ ϕCD.
Consequently we have LS 6≦ LCD as required.
To further elaborate on this result, what is really being put to use here is the ability of the
safe belief modality to (at least in part) talk about propositional symbols that do not occur in
a formula. This is an effect of the derived relation a depending on the largest bisimulation.
5.2 Expressivity of Degrees of Belief
We have now settled that safe belief is at least as expressive as conditional belief, and further
that the combination of the conditional belief modality and the degrees of belief modality does
not allow us to express the safe belief modality. A hasty conclusion would be that the safe
belief modality is the one modality to rule them all, but this is not so. In fact LS (equivalent
to LCS cf. Corollary 3) falls short when it comes to expressing degrees of belief, which we
now continue to prove.
Lemma 10. Let p, q be distinct symbols in P , and let M = (W,≥, V ) and M ′ = (W ′,≥′, V ′)
denote the two plausibility models presented in Figure 6. Then for P ′ = P \ {q} we have that
(M,x1) ≡
S
P ′ (M
′, x′).
Proof. We will show the following stronger version of this lemma: For i ∈ {1, 2} : (M,xi) ≡
S
P ′
(M ′, x′) and (M,y) ≡SP ′ (M
′, y′). We proceed by induction on ϕ ∈ LSP ′ , showing that:
for i ∈ {1, 2} :M,xi |= ϕ iff M
′, x′ |= ϕ and M,y |= ϕ iff M ′, y′ |= ϕ (1)
For the base case we have ϕ = r for some r ∈ P \{q}. Because r 6= q it is clear that r ∈ V (x1)
iff r ∈ V ′(x′). Since we also have V (x2) = V
′(x′) and V ′(y) = V (y′) this completes the
base case. The cases of negation and conjunction are readily established using the induction
hypothesis, and ϕ = Kaψ is shown just as we did in the proof of Lemma 9. Before proceeding
we recall that A = {a} and note that for any w ∈ W we have [w]a = {x1, x2, y}, as well as
[w′]a = {x
′, y′} for any w′ ∈W ′. Moreover, the largest bisimulation onM andM ′ respectively
is the identity relation, meaning that ≥a=a and ≥
′
a=
′
a. For the case of ϕ = aψ we can
therefore argue as follows.
M,x1 |= aψ ⇔M,x1 |= ψ
(IH)
⇐=⇒M ′, x′ |= ψ ⇔M ′, x′ |= aψ
M,x2 |= aψ ⇔ (∀i ∈ {1, 2} :M,xi |= ψ)
(IH)
⇐=⇒M ′, x′ |= ψ ⇔M ′, x′ |= aψ
M, y |= aψ ⇔ (∀w ∈W :M,w |= ψ)
(IH)
⇐=⇒ (∀w′ ∈W ′ :M ′, w′ |= ψ)⇔M ′, y′ |= aψ
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Figure 6: Two single-agent plausibility models and their normal plausibility relations (dashed
arrows). As usual reflexive arrows are omitted.
In fact the last line is essentially the case of Kaψ, as the image of y under a is W (and W
′
is the image of y′ under ′a). This concludes our proof by induction, shows (1) and allows us
to conclude that (M,x1) ≡
S
P ′ (M
′, x′).
Proposition 12. LD 6≦ LS.
Proof. Consider the formula B1ap ∈ L
D with p ∈ P , and additionally take any formula
ϕS ∈ L
S
P . As ϕS is finite and P is countably infinite, there will be some q 6= p which does
not occur in ϕS . With P
′ = P \ {q} we therefore have ϕS ∈ L
S
P ′ . As we can always make
such a choice of p and q, this means that there always exists models (M,x1), (M
′, x′) of the
form given in Figure 6.
As in the proof of Lemma 10 the largest bisimulation on M and M ′ is the identity and
so Min1a[x1]a = {x1, x2} and Min
1
a[x
′]a = {x
′, y′}. Consequently M,x1 |= B
1
ap whereas
M ′, x′ 6|= B1ap. Since ϕS ∈ L
S
P ′ it follows from Lemma 10 that M,x |= ϕS iff M
′, x′ |= ϕS .
What this proves is that using the formula B1ap of L
D, no matter the choice of formula ϕS
of LS there will be models which B1ap distinguishes but ϕS does not, hence B
1
ap 6≡ ϕS . From
this follows LD 6≦ LS as required.
We find that this result is quite surprising. Again it is a consequence of our use of the
largest bisimulation when defining our semantics. The purpose of x1 in model M (which is
otherwise identical to M ′) is to inject an additional belief sphere without adding any factual
content from P ′, as that could allow the safe belief formula ϕS to distinguish x1 from x2.
At this point it might seem as if all hope was lost for the conditional belief modality,
however our final direct result somewhat rebuilds the reputation of this hard-pressed modality.
To this end we define for any k ∈ N the language LDk, which contains every formula of LD
for which if Bnaϕ occurs then n ≤ k. In other words formulas of L
Dk talk about belief to at
most degree k, which comes in handy as we investigate the relative expressive power of LD
and LC .
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Figure 7: Two single-agent plausibility models. We’ve omitted reflexive arrows and for the
sake of readability also some transitive arrows.
Lemma 11. Let k ∈ N be given, and let (Mk, w0) and (N
k, w′0) denote the two plausibility
models presented in Figure 7. Then we have that (Mk, w0) and (N
k, w′0) are modally equivalent
in LDk.
Proof. We prove a stronger version of this lemma, namely that (Mk, wi) ≡
Dk (Nk, w′i) for
0 ≤ i ≤ k, (Mk, x) ≡Dk (Nk, x′) and (Mk, y) ≡Dk (Nk, y′).
Key to this proof is the fact that x (resp. y) has the same valuation as x′ (resp. y′), and
that x is more plausible than y whereas y′ is more plausible than x′. We proceed by induction
on ϕ ∈ LDk. In the base case ϕ is a propositional symbol, and so as the valuation of each wi
matches that of w′i (0 ≤ i ≤ k), x matches x
′ and y matches y′ this completes the base case.
The cases of negation and conjunction readily follow using the induction hypothesis, and for
ϕ = Kaψ the argument is essentially that used in the proof of Lemma 9.
Lastly we consider ϕ = Bjaψ for any 0 ≤ j ≤ k, and recall that this is sufficient as ϕ ∈ LDkP .
As neither model contains two worlds with the same valuation, the largest autobisimulation
on either model is the identity, and so both models are normal. With the epistemic relation
of agent a being total, we have for all w ∈W that Minja[w]a = {w0, . . . , wj} and similarly for
all w′ ∈W ′ that Minja[w
′]a = {w
′
0, . . . , w
′
j}. We therefore have
∀w ∈W :Mk, w |= Bjaψ ⇔ ∀v ∈ {w0, . . . , wj} :M
k, v |= ψ
(IH)
⇐=⇒
∀v′ ∈ {w′0, . . . , w
′
j} : N
k, v′ |= ψ ⇔ ∀w′ ∈W ′ : Nk, w′ |= Bjaψ
as required. Observe that we can apply the induction hypothesis since j ≤ k, and that
importantly x, y are not in Minja[w]a, and x
′, y′ are not in Minja[w
′]a. Thus we have shown
that (Mk, w0) ≡
Dk (Nk, w′0) thereby completing the proof.
Proposition 13. LC 6≦ LD.
Proof. Consider now Bqar belonging to LC and any formula ϕD ∈ L
D. Since ϕD is finite
we can choose some k ∈ N such that ϕD ∈ L
Dk. Because p0, . . . , pk, q, r are taken from the
countably infinite set P , no matter the choice of k there exists pointed plausibility models
(Mk, w0) and (N
k, w′0) as presented in Figure 7.
To determine the truth of Bqar in (Mk, w0) and (N
k, w′0) respectively we point out that
[[q]]Mk = {x, y} and [[q]]Nk = {y
′, x′}. Therefore we have that Mina([[q]]Mk ∩ [w0]a) = {x}
and Mina([[q]]Nk ∩ [w
′
0]a) = {y
′}. Since Mk, x |= r and Nk, y′ 6|= r, it follows Mk, w0 |= B
q
ar
whereas Nk, w′0 6|= B
q
ar. By Lemma 11 we have that Mk, w0 |= ϕD iff N
k, w′0 |= ϕD. With
this we have shown that taking the formula Bqar of LC , there are for any ϕD ∈ L
D pointed
plausibility models which Bqar distinguishes but ϕD does not, thus B
q
ar 6≡ ϕD. It follows that
LC 6≦ LD as required.
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Figure 8: Summary of expressivity results for our logics. An arrow X −−→ X ′ indicates that
LX
′
is more expressive than LX . A zig-zag line between X and X ′ means that LX and LX
′
are incomparable. The abbreviation (C)DS means both CDS and DS, and similarly for
C(S) indicating both CS and S. Labels on arrows and zig-zag lines signify from where the
result is taken in Table 1.
We have now shown that the degrees of belief modality cannot capture the conditional
belief modality. What this really showcases is that for Bψa ϕ, ψ potentially enables us to talk
about worlds of arbitrarily large degree. This sets it apart from the degrees of belief modality,
and causes for instance a difference in expressivity.
5.3 Mapping Out the Relative Expressive Power
With the results we have now shown, we are in fact able to determine the relative expressivity
of all our languages. To this end we make use of the following facts related to expressivity,
where we let L, L′ and L′′ denote logical languages interpreted on the same class of models:
(a) If L is a sublanguage of L′ then L ≦ L′.
(b) If L ≦ L′ and L′ ≦ L′′ then L ≦ L′′ (transitivity).
(c) If L ≡ L′ then L ≦ L′′ iff L′ ≦ L′′ (transitivity consequence 1).
(d) If L ≦ L′ and L′′ 6≦ L′ then L′′ 6≦ L (transitivity consequence 2).
(e) If L ≦ L′ and L 6≦ L′′ then L′ 6≦ L′′ (transitivity consequence 3).
Now comes our main result, which shows the relative expressivity between the logic of
conditional belief, the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief.
Theorem 4. LC < LS, LC ⊲⊳ LD, LD ⊲⊳ LS.
Proof. See the derivation of (4), (7) and (10) in Table 1.
Beyond showing the above theorem, Table 1 fully accounts for the relative expressivity
between LC , LD, LS, LCD and LDS . Finally, using Corollary 3 and property (c) we have
that any expressivity result for LS holds for LCS and similarly for LDS and LCDS . A more
pleasing presentation of these results is found in Figure 8.
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# Result Inferred from
(1) LC ≦ LS Corollary 3.
(2) LS 6≦ LCD Proposition 11.
(3) LS 6≦ LC LC ≦ LCD from (a), LS 6≦ LCD from (2) and applying (d).
(4) LC < LS LC ≦ LS from (1), LS 6≦ LC from (3).
(5) LD 6≦ LS Proposition 12.
(6) LS 6≦ LD LD ≦ LCD from (a), LS 6≦ LCD from (2) and applying (d).
(7) LD ⊲⊳ LS LD 6≦ LS from (5), LS 6≦ LD from (6).
(8) LC 6≦ LD Proposition 13.
(9) LD 6≦ LC LC ≦ LS from (1), LD 6≦ LS from (5) and applying (d).
(10) LC ⊲⊳ LD LC 6≦ LD from (8), LD 6≦ LC from (9).
(11) LCD 6≦ LC LD ≦ LCD from (a), LD 6≦ LC from (9) and applying (e).
(12) LC < LCD LC ≦ LCD from (a), LCD 6≦ LD from (13).
(13) LCD 6≦ LD LC ≦ LCD from (a), LC 6≦ LD from (8) and applying (e).
(14) LD < LCD LD ≦ LCD from (a), LCD 6≦ LD from (13).
(15) LCD 6≦ LS LD ≦ LCD from (a), LD 6≦ LS from (5) and applying (e).
(16) LS ⊲⊳ LCD LS 6≦ LCD from (2), LCD 6≦ LS from (15).
(17) LCDS ≦ LDS LCDS ≡ LDS from Corollary 3 and Definition 11.
(18) LC ≦ LDS LC ≦ LCDS from (a), LCDS ≦ LDS from (17) and applying (b).
(19) LDS 6≦ LC LS ≦ LDS from (a), LS 6≦ LC from (3) and applying (e).
(20) LC < LDS LC ≦ LDS from (18), LDS 6≦ LC from (19).
(21) LDS 6≦ LD LS ≦ LDS from (a), LS 6≦ LD from (6) and applying (e).
(22) LD < LDS LD ≦ LDS from (a), LDS 6≦ LD from (21).
(23) LCD ≦ LDS LCD ≦ LCDS from (a), LCDS ≦ LDS from (17) and applying (b).
(24) LDS 6≦ LS LCD ≦ LDS from (23), LCD 6≦ LS from (15) and applying (e).
(25) LS < LDS LS ≦ LDS from (a), LDS 6≦ LS from (24).
(26) LCD 6≦ LDS LS ≦ LDS from (a), LS 6≦ LCD from (2) and applying (e).
(27) LCD < LDS LCD ≦ LDS from (23), LCD 6≦ LDS from (26).
Table 1: Derivation of the relative expressivity of our logics. Each of the references (a), (b),
(d) and (e) refer to properties stated at the start of Section 5.3. Bold faced numbers are
illustrated in Figure 8.
5.4 Reflection on bisimulation characterisation and expressivity
Our bisimulation characterisation results are:
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡C (M ′, w′) Theorem 1
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡D (M ′, w′) Theorem 2
(M,w)↔(M ′, w′) iff (M,w) ≡S (M ′, w′) Theorem 3
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In other words, bisimulation corresponds to modal equivalence in all three logics. Our ex-
pressivity results can be summarised as (Theorem 4)
LC < LS
LC ⊲⊳ LD
LD ⊲⊳ LS
The logic of conditional belief is less expressive than the logic of safe belief, the logic of
conditional belief and the logic of degrees of belief are incomparable, as are the logic of
degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief.
Our results on bisimulation characterisation suggest that, in some sense, the three logics
are the same, whereas our results on expressive power suggest that, in another sense, the three
logics are different. It is therefore a good moment to explain how to interpret our results.
The bisimulation characterisation result in Corollary 1 says that the information content
of a given plausibility model is equally well described in the three logics. Now consider an
even more specific case: a finite model; and consider a characteristic formula of that model
(these can be shown to exist for plausibility models along the lines of [31, 38]—where we note
that we take models, not pointed models). For a modelM this gives us, respectively, formulas
ϕCM , ϕ
D
M , and ϕ
S
M . Then the bisimulation characterisation results say that ϕ
C
M , ϕ
D
M , and ϕ
S
M
are all equivalent. Now a characteristic formula is a very special formula with a unique model
(modulo bisimilarity). For other formulas that do not have a singleton denotation (again,
modulo bisimilarity) in the class of plausibility models, this equivalence cannot be achieved.
That is the expressivity result. For example, given that LC < LS , there is a safe belief formula
that is not equivalent to any conditional belief formula. This formula should then describe
a property that has several non-bisimilar models. It is indeed the case that the formula ♦ap
used in the proof of Proposition 11 demonstrating LC < LS has many models! It is tempting
to allow ourselves a simplication and to say that the expressivity hierarchy breaks down if we
restrict ourselves to formulas with unique models.4
Finally, we must point out that in the publication on single-agent bisimulation [4, p. 285],
we posed the following conjecture:
In an extended version of the paper we are confident that we will prove that the
logics of conditional belief and knowledge, of degrees of belief and knowledge, and
both with the addition of safe belief are all expressively equivalent.
It therefore seems appropriate to note that we have proved our own confident selves resound-
ingly wrong!
6 Comparison and applications
We compare our bisimulation results to those in Demey’s work [13], our expressivity results
to those obtained in Baltag and Smets’ [7], and finally discuss the relevance of our results for
epistemic planning [10].
4If we consider infinitary versions of the modalities in our logical languages, in other words, common
knowledge and common belief modalities, we preserve the bisimulation characterisation results (for a more
refined notion of bisimulation) but it is then to be expected that all three logics become equally expressive
(oral communication by Tim French).
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Figure 9: According to Demey’s notion of bisimulation, model Mi (above) with alternating
¬p and p worlds is a bisimulation contraction. In this particular case i is odd as p does not
hold at wi. According to our notion of bisimulation, all p worlds in model Mi are bisimilar
and also all ¬p worlds. Model M2 (below) is the contraction.
Bisimulation Prior to our work Demey discussed the model theory of plausibility models in
great detail in [13]. Our results add to the valuable original results he obtained. Demey does
not consider degrees of belief; he considers knowledge, conditional belief and safe belief. Our
plausibility models are what [13] refers to as uniform and locally connected epistemic plau-
sibility models; he also considers models with fewer restrictions on the plausibility function.
But given [13, Theorem 35], these types of models are for all intents and purposes equivalent
to ours. The semantics for conditional belief and knowledge are as ours, but his semantics
for safe belief is different (namely as in [7]). The difference is that in his case an agent safely
believes ϕ if ϕ is true in all worlds as least as plausible as the current world, whereas in our
case it is like that but in the normalised model. This choice of semantics has several highly
significant implications as we will return to shortly.
In line with his interpretation of safe belief as a standard modality, Demey’s notion of
bisimulation for plausibility models is also standard. For example, whereas we require that
[forth≥] If v ∈W and w ≥
R
a v, ∃v
′ ∈W such that w′ ≥Ra v
′ and (v, v′) ∈ R,
where we recall that w ≥Ra v means Mina([w]R ∩ [w]a) ≥a Mina([v]R ∩ [v]a), he requires that
[forth≥] If v ∈W and w ≥a v, ∃v
′ ∈W such that w′ ≥a v
′ and (v, v′) ∈ R.
He obtains correspondence for bisimulation and modal equivalence in the logic of safe belief
in [13, Footnote 12 and Theorem 32]. Our notion of bisimulation is less restrictive, as we will
now illustrate by way of the examples in Figure 9.
Consider model Mi in Figure 9. This is a single-agent model on a single proposition p
containing i worlds, where the image of a world wj under ≥a is {w1, . . . , wj}. The valuation
is such that if the index of a world is even then p holds, and otherwise p does not hold. Now,
using Demey’s notion of bisimulation entails that the largest autobisimulation on Mi is the
identity, and thus Mi is a bisimulation contraction. For example, we can find a formula that
distinguishes (Mi, wi) from (Mi+2, wi+2). For safe belief  we now have Demey’s semantics
(see above) M,w |= aϕ iff M,v |= ϕ for all v with w ≥a v. We now define ϕ0 = ⊤ and for
any natural number n ≥ 1 we let:
ϕn =
{
♦a(ϕn−1 ∧ p) if n is even;
♦a(ϕn−1 ∧ ¬p) if n is odd;
for example
ϕ4 = ♦a(♦a(♦a(♦a(⊤ ∧ ¬p) ∧ p) ∧ ¬p) ∧ p).
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We now have that for any i ≥ 1, Mi, wi |= ϕi ∧ ¬ϕi+1, which makes this a distinguishing
formula between (Mi, wi) from (Mi+2, wi+2). In fact, the semantics of a allow us to count
the number of worlds in Mi. In this sense Demey’s logic is immensely expressive.
Again referring to Figure 9, consider M3, the model with a most plausible ¬p world, a
less plausible p world and an even less plausible ¬p world. In the logic LC of conditional
belief w1 and w3 of M3 are modally equivalent. Hence they also ought to be bisimilar. But
in Demey’s notion of bisimilarity they are not. Hence we have a mismatch between modal
equivalence and bisimilarity, which is not supposed to happen: it is possible for two worlds to
be modally equivalent but not bisimilar. Demey also was aware of this, of course. To remedy
the problem one can either strengthen the notion of modal equivalence or weaken the notion
of bisimilarity. Demey chose the former (namely by adding the safe belief modality to the
conditional belief modality), we chose the latter. Thus we regain the correspondence between
bisimilarity and modal equivalence. Baltag and Smets [7] achieve the same via a different
route: they include in the language special propositional symbols, so-called S-propositions.
The denotation of an S-proposition can be any subset of the domain. This therefore also
makes the language much more expressive.
We believe that in particular for application purposes, weakening the notion of bisimu-
lation, as we have done, is preferable over strengthening the logic, as in [7, 13]. This come
at the price of a more complex bisimulation definition (and, although we did not investigate
this, surely a higher complexity of determining whether two worlds are bisimilar), but, we
venture to observe, also a very elegant bisimulation definition given the ingenious use of the
bisimulation relation itself in the definition of the forth and back conditions of bisimulation.
We consider this one of the highlights of our work.
Expressivity In [7] one finds many original expressivity results. Our results copy those,
but also go beyond. We recall Table 1 for the full picture of our results, and the main results of
those namely LC < LS , LC ⊲⊳ LD, and LD ⊲⊳ LS. The first, LC < LS , is originally found in [7,
page 34, Equation 1.7], and we obtained it using the same embedding translation. However, it
may be worth to point out that in our case this translation still holds for the (in our opinion)
more proper bisimulation preserving notion of safe belief. Baltag and Smets’ S-propositions
are arbitrary subsets of the domain, the (unnecessarily) far more expressive notion of safe
belief. Baltag and Smets also discuss degrees of belief but do not obtain expressivity results
for that, so LC ⊲⊳ LD may be considered novel and interesting. In artificial intelligence, the
degrees of belief notion seems more widely in use than the conditional belief notion, so an
informed reader had better be aware of the incomparability of both logics and may choose
the logic to suit his or her needs. The result that LD ⊲⊳ LS could possibly also be considered
unexpected, and therefore valuable.
Planning An application area of plausibility models is epistemic planning. A consequence
of Demey’s notion of bisimulation is that even for single-agent models on a finite set of
propositions, the set of distinct, contraction-minimal pointed plausibility models is infinite.
For example, we recall that in Figure 9 any two pointed plausibility models in {(Mi, wi) |
i ∈ N} are non-bisimilar. With our notion of bisimulation, there are in the single-agent case
only finitely many distinct pointed plausibility models up to bisimulation. This was already
reported in [4]. Our motivation for this bisimulation investigation was indeed prompted by
the application of doxastic logics in planning.
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In planning, an agent attempt to find a sequence of action, a plan, that achieves a given
goal. A planning problem implicitly represents a state-transition system, where transitions are
induced by actions. By exploring this state-space we can reason about actions and synthesise
plans. A growing community investigates planning by applying dynamic epistemic logics
[10, 26, 1], where actions are epistemic actions. Planning with doxastic modalities has also
been considered [2]. This is done by identifying states with (pointed) plausibility models, and
the goal with a formula of the doxastic language. Epistemic actions can be public actions,
like hard and soft announcements [32], but also non-public actions, such as event models [7].
With the state-space consisting of plausibility models, model theoretic results become
pivotal when deciding the plan existence problem. Unlike Demey’s approach, our framework
leads to a finite state-space in the single-agent case and therefore the single-agent plan exis-
tence problem is decidable [10]. At the same time we know that even in a purely epistemic
setting the multi-agent plan existence problem is undecidable [10]. But by placing certain
restrictions on the planning problem it is possible to find decidable fragments even in the
multi-agent case, for example, event models with propositional preconditions [41].
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